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RESEARCH OBJECTIVES This thesis analyzes the relation between accounting quality and terms of 
debt. The purpose is to examine whether firms with high accounting 
quality are able to obtain debt financing at better terms (i.e. with lower 
interest rate, less securitization and longer maturity) than firms with low 
accounting quality. 
DATA The empirical data is provided by a large, globally operating credit rating 
agency. It comprises both original (reported by firms) and adjusted 
(modified by the rating agency) financial statement figures. The research 
sample consists of 842 firm-year observations from years 2005-2007. It 
includes data from 61 industries and 47 countries. All sample firms report 
under the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). 
RESULTS I find evidence supporting the hypothesis that accounting quality is 
incorporated into debt contracts.  The information risk from lower 
accounting quality is, however, mainly reflected in the interest rate: the 
lower the accounting quality, the higher the interest rate. The evidence on 
the association between accounting quality and securitization and 
maturity is weaker and somewhat mixed. 
I also find that financial statement adjustments made by the rating agency, 
in general, make the sample firms look more risky. For a majority of firms, 
the adjustments increase leverage and decrease profitability ratios. 
Overall, the results indicate that (1) lenders consider borrowers’ 
accounting quality when they determine the terms of debt contract and 
(2) the financial statement adjustments made by the rating agency provide 
information that is useful to lenders. 
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TAVOITTEET Tutkimuksen tavoitteena on selvittää, parantaako korkea tilinpäätöksen laatu lainan 
ehtoja. Toisin sanoen, saavatko korkealaatuista tilinpäätösinformaatiota tuottavat 
yrityksen lainaa paremmin ehdoin (matalammalla korolla, vähemmin vakuuksin ja 
pidemmällä maksuajalla) kuin yritykset joiden tilinpäätöksen laatu on heikko. 
AINEISTO Tutkimuksen empiirinen aineisto on saatu suurelta, kansainvälisesti toimivalta 
luottoluokitusyritykseltä. Aineisto sisältää sekä yritysten raportoimat että 
luottoluokitusyrityksen oikaisemat tilinpäätösluvut. Tutkimusotos koostuu 842 
havainnosta vuosilta 2005-2007. Havaintoja on 61 eri toimialalta ja 47 maasta. 
Kaikki otokseen kuuluvat yritykset raportoivat noudattaen kansainvälisiä IFRS-
standardeja (International Financial Reporting Standards). 
TULOKSET Tutkimustulokset tukevat hypoteesia, jonka mukaan tilinpäätöksen laatu vaikuttaa 
velan ehtoihin. Tilinpäätöksen laadun vaikutus kuitenkin heijastuu lähinnä 
korkotasoon: korkealaatuista tilinpäätösinformaatiota tuottavat yrityksen saavat 
lainaa matalammalla korolla kuin heikompilaatuista informaatiota tuottavat 
yritykset. Tilinpäätösinformaation laatu ei juuri näytä vaikuttavan vaadittavien 
vakuuksien määrään tai laina-aikaan. 
Tutkimuksessa havaitaan myös, että oikaistut tilinpäätösluvut saavat yrityksen 
näyttämään riskisemmältä kuin raportoidut luvut. Suurimmalla osalla yrityksistä 
oikaisut lisäävät velkaantuneisuutta ja pienentävät kannattavuutta kuvaavia 
tunnuslukuja. 
Yleisesti ottaen tulokset viittaavat siihen, että (1) tilinpäätöksen laatu vaikuttaa velan 
ehtoihin ja (2) tilinpäätösoikaisut sisältävät lainanantajan kannalta hyödyllistä tietoa. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background and motivation 
Debt is a major source of new external financing. For example Henderson et al. (2001) 
note that debt issuances are substantially more common than equity issuances. In their 
cross-country study, they found that during the sample period of 1990 to 2001 firms 
raised approximately $25.3 trillion of new capital, with debt issuance accounting for 
$20.8 trillion (82%) of all securities issued. According to Altunbas et al. (2009), 
corporate bonds and syndicated loans made up 94% of all public funds raised in the 
European capital markets in 2007, while public equity issuance accounted for only 6%. 
Armstrong et al. (2010, 214) point out that even though many of the debt issuances are 
likely to be replacing existing debt, it is clear that firms access debt markets far more 
frequently than equity markets. Yet they observe that most of the focus of capital 
markets accounting research has historically been on equity markets. 
Just over ten years ago Sloan (2001, 343) noted that “the explicit role of accounting 
information in debt contracts is extensive, but there is a relative little research in this 
area”. It looks, however, that debt markets have recently begun to gain more and more 
attention from researchers. For example, a search from Social Science Research 
Network (SSRN)1 website yields dozens of recent accounting papers that handle debt 
contracting issues. Also Armstrong et al. (2010, 217) observe this development. They 
state that “the literature on how attributes of accounting system affect the design of 
debt contracts is both relatively new and growing”. In their recent paper, Costello and 
Wittenberg-Moerman (2011, 98) even state that “[t]he role of financial reporting quality 
in debt contracting is one of the fundamental issues in accounting research”. 
A central goal of accounting information is to mitigate information asymmetry problems 
between a firm and those providing resources to a firm (e.g. lenders and shareholders) 
by providing decision useful information (IASB, 2010). Defining “decision useful” is, 
however, not straightforward. Li (2011) notes that although lenders and shareholders 
claim on the same assets and profits, their use of accounting information is likely to be 
fundamentally different for two main reasons. First, while the upside potential is likely 
                                                        
1 Social Science Research Network (http://www.ssrn.com) is a website devoted to the rapid worldwide 
dissemination of social science research. Most accounting related studies are published on SSRN before 
being submitted to an academic journal. 
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to be important for shareholders, lenders are mainly concerned about the downside 
risk. Second, compared to shareholders, lenders are less concerned about the long-term 
prospects of the firm beyond the debt horizon. Furthermore, Armstrong et al. (2010, 
214-215) point out that information needs differ not only between debt and equity 
providers, but also within various suppliers of debt. That is, the information needs of 
banks, for example, are likely to differ from those of bondholders. 
The importance of credit rating agencies has grown considerably during recent years, 
and they now have a major role in the debt markets (Jorion et al., 2009). Rating agencies 
act as information intermediaries that gather and analyze information about companies 
and provide assessment of their creditworthiness. (Beaver et al., 2006). As a central 
part of their rating process, rating agencies such as Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s 
analyze financial statements and make analytical adjustments to them. The purpose of 
these adjustments is to modify financial information so that it better reflects the 
underlying economics of a firm, and facilitates comparability (Moody's, 2005). 
Furthermore, adjustments aim at producing better estimates of the creditors’ risks and 
rights (Standard & Poor's, 2007). Financial statement adjustments can thus be seen as a 
mechanism that enhances the decision usefulness of accounting information, at least in 
the credit risk assessment context. 
1.2 Research question 
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the association between accounting quality and 
terms of debt.  More specifically, I analyze whether high-quality accounting helps to 
mitigate the information asymmetry problems between lenders and borrowers so that 
lenders are able to provide loans with lower interest rates, less securitization and 
longer maturities. The research question is formulated as follows: 
Are firms with high accounting quality able to obtain debt financing at better 
terms than firms with low accounting quality? 
1.3 Data and research design 
The data used in the empirical analysis is provided by a large, globally operating credit 
rating agency. It comprises balance sheet, income statement and cash flow statement 
information, as well as credit ratings. The special feature of the data is that it includes 
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both original (reported by firms) and adjusted (modified by the rating agency) financial 
figures. The research sample consists of 842 firm-year observations from years 2005-
2007. It includes data from 61 industries and 47 countries. All sample firms report 
under the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). 
1.4 Results 
I find that the financial statement adjustments made by the credit rating agency, in 
general, make the sample firms appear more risky. The adjustments have a strong 
impact especially on LEVERAGE, which is adjusted upward for 93.7% of the sample and 
experiences a median increase of 18.3%. I also find evidence supporting the hypothesis 
that accounting quality is incorporated into debt contracts.  The information risk from 
lower accounting quality is, however, mainly reflected in the interest rate. The evidence 
on the association between accounting quality and securitization and maturity is 
weaker and somewhat mixed. Finally, my results suggest that the impact of accounting 
quality differs between investment grade and speculative grade firms. Overall, the 
results indicate that (1) lenders consider borrowers’ accounting quality when they 
determine the terms of debt contract and (2) the financial statement adjustment made 
by the rating agency provide information that is useful to lenders. 
This thesis adds to the growing body of literature examining the association between 
accounting quality and debt contracting. Contrary to most previous studies that employ 
US GAAP data, this thesis utilizes data from IFRS firms. Moreover, this thesis provides 
evidence on the decision usefulness of the rating agency’s financial statement 
adjustments. 
1.5 Structure 
The rest of this thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 presents the theoretical 
framework. It introduces the concept of accounting quality and provides an overview of 
debt markets, credit ratings and financial statement adjustments made by credit rating 
agencies. Chapter 3 reviews prior studies. Chapter 4 motivates and presents the 
hypotheses. Chapter 5 describes data, variables and methodology used in the empirical 
analysis.  Chapter 6 reports and discusses the empirical results. Chapter 7 concludes. 
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2 ACCOUNTING QUALITY, DEBT MARKETS AND CREDIT RATINGS 
2.1 Accounting quality 
The need for financial reporting arises from the separation between ownership and 
management. It can be viewed as a mechanism that helps owners and other capital 
providers to monitor the performance and financial situation of the company. In other 
words, financial reporting serves as a vehicle that reduces the information asymmetry 
between the outsiders (e.g. lenders) and insiders (e.g. managers) of the company. To 
succeed in this task, financial reporting must be of high quality, i.e. it must provide 
faithfully represented information that is relevant for decision making. This section 
discusses the factors that affect the demand and quality of financial reporting. 
2.1.1 The role of accounting information in decreasing information asymmetry 
An economy is said to be characterized by information asymmetry when some parties 
to business transactions may have an information advantage over others. There are two 
major types of information asymmetry – adverse selection and moral hazard. Adverse 
selection occurs when some people (e.g. firm manager or other insiders) know more 
about the current conditions and future prospects of the firm than outside investors. 
They can then exploit this information advantage by for example biasing information or 
delaying its release. This reduces outside investors’ abilities to make good investment 
decisions and make capital markets function less effectively than they should. Moral 
hazard, in turn, occurs when some parties of business transaction can observe the 
consequences of their action but other parties cannot. Moral hazard problem exist 
mostly because of the separation of ownership and control that is typical for large 
business entities. For example, the manager may be tempted to shirk in effort because it 
is difficult to observe whether deterioration in firm performance is caused by the lack of 
managerial effort or by other factors. (Scott, 2009, 13-14, 114-117).  
Financial accounting and reporting can be seen as a mechanism that helps to convert 
inside information into public information, thereby reducing the information 
asymmetry problem. Beyer et al. (2010) identify two important roles that accounting 
information has in market-based economies. First, it allows capital providers to 
evaluate the return potential of investment opportunities. This valuation role of 
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accounting information helps to mitigate the adverse selection problems caused by 
information asymmetry between outside capital providers and firm insiders. Second, it 
allows capital providers to monitor the use of their capital. This stewardship role of 
accounting information helps to mitigate the moral hazard problems that result from 
the separation of ownership and control. 
Figure 1 illustrates the role of financial reporting in markets that are not fully efficient. 
The outer circle of the figure depicts the fundamental value of the firm. The second 
circle depicts the efficient market price of the firm, i.e. price that comprises all publicly 
available information. The inner circle represents the inefficient market price of the 
firm, i.e. price that does not corporate all publicly available information. The role of 
financial reporting is (1) to reduce information asymmetry by converting inside 
information into outside information (enlarging the second circle) and (2) to reduce 
inefficiencies by reporting information so that it is easily available and understandable 
(making the mispricing area between the inner and second circle as small as possible). 
(Scott, 2009, 116-117, 190). 
FIGURE 1: ROLE OF FINANCIAL REPORTING IN DECREASING INFORMATION ASYMMETRY 
 
 
Source: Scott (2009, 190) 
Inefficient market price of firm 
Efficient market price of firm 
Roles of financial reporting 
Fundamental value of firm 
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2.1.2 Defining accounting quality 
The previous section established that demand for financial accounting arises from the 
need to mitigate information asymmetry problems between firm insiders and outsiders. 
This raises a question: How should financial information be prepared and presented so 
that it can succeed in this task? Scott (2009, 59) states that there does not exist a 
theoretically correct way to prepare financial statements. He, however, notes that if 
accountants understand the decision problems of financial statement users, they can 
tailor financial statement information so that it is more useful. 
Major accounting standard-setting bodies such as the IASB2 and FASB3 have also 
adopted this decision usefulness approach in their conceptual frameworks (Scott, 2009, 
88). For example, the IASB framework (2010) states that the purpose of financial 
reporting is “to provide financial information about the reporting entity that is useful to 
existing and potential investors, lenders and other creditors in making decisions about 
providing resources to the entity. Those decisions involve buying, selling or holding 
equity and debt instruments, and providing or settling loans and other forms of credit.” 
Moreover, the IASB Framework (2010) identifies the qualitative characteristics that 
make the financial statement information useful. The two fundamental qualitative 
characteristics are relevance and faithful representation. Information is considered to 
be relevant if it is capable of making a difference in the decisions made by users, i.e. if it 
has predictive or confirmatory value (or both). Materiality is an entity-specific aspect of 
relevance: information is material if omitting or misstating it could influence the 
decision making based on financial information. To be useful, financial information 
must not only represent relevant phenomena – it must also faithfully represent the 
phenomena that it purports to represent. A perfectly faithful representation has three 
characteristics: it is complete, neutral and free from error. In addition to these two 
fundamental qualitative characteristics, the framework also lists four enhancing 
qualitative characteristics: comparability, verifiability, timeliness and understandability. 
The framework recognizes that financial reports cannot provide all possible 
information because of cost constraint – reporting financial information imposes costs, 
                                                        
2 International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) is the standard setting body responsible for 
developing the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). 
3 Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) is the standard setting body responsible for developing 
the Generally Accepted Accounting Principles in the U.S. (US GAAP). 
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and these costs must be justified by the benefits. Figure 2 presents the hierarchy of 
accounting qualities as they are defined in the IASB framework (2010). 
 
FIGURE 2: QUALITATIVE CHARACTERISTICS OF ACCOUNTING INFORMATION 
  
 DECISION USEFULNESS 
   
Pervasive 
constraint 
Benefits > Costs 
     
     
Fundamental 
qualitative 
characteristics 
RELEVANCE 
  FAITHFULL 
REPRESENTATION   
Ingredients of 
fundamental 
qualitative 
characteristics 
Predictive 
value 
Confirmatory 
value 
  Complete Neutral 
Free 
from 
error 
Materiality    
   
Enhancing 
qualitative 
characteristics 
Comparability Verifiability Timeliness Understandability 
     
The figure is based on the IASB framework (2010) 
 
Scott (2009, 65) notes that concepts of accounting quality and decision usefulness are 
closely intertwined. He uses the term “informative” to refer to high-quality, transparent 
and precise accounting information. Scott (2009, 66) states that the more informative 
the financial statement, the more decision useful it is. In other words, high-quality 
accounting information enables better predictions about the future of a firm and thus 
facilitates decision making. In the debt market context, this implies that when 
borrower’s accounting quality is high, it is easier for the creditor to assess its 
creditworthiness and thereby make better lending decisions. 
Even though accounting quality is a recurring topic in accounting literature, there is no 
uniform definition of what it exactly comprises. Moreover, since accounting quality 
cannot be observed directly, there are no unambiguous ways to measure it. (Verleun et 
al., 2011, 50). As a result, researchers have developed various proxies for accounting 
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quality. In debt-related accounting research, commonly used quality measures include 
accruals (e.g. Bharath et al., 2008; Dechow & Dichev, 2002; Francis, Schipper et al., 
2005; Jorion et al., 2009; Sufi, 2007) and disclosure policy (e.g. Leuz & Verrecchia, 2000; 
Sengupta, 1998; Yu, 2005). Research on accounting quality and its impact on debt 
contracting is reviewed in more detail in chapter 3. 
2.1.3 Factors influencing accounting quality 
The IASB aims at developing an internationally acceptable set of high quality financial 
reporting standards. To achieve this goal, it has issued principles-based standards, and 
taken steps to remove allowable accounting alternatives and to require accounting 
measurements that better reflect a firm’s economic position and performance. (Barth et 
al., 2008, 468). The purpose of uniform accounting standards is to reduce managers’ 
ability to record similar economic transactions in dissimilar ways. In real world, 
however, the financial statement information usually does not capture the underlying 
business reality perfectly. (Palepu et al., 2007, 89-90). Palepu et al. (2007, 89-94) list 
three potential sources of noise and bias in accounting data: (1) rigidity of accounting 
standards, (2) forecast errors and (3) managers’ accounting choices. 
Rigidity of accounting standards 
Rigid standards may help to increase the credibility of financial statements by limiting a 
firm’s ability to distort them. The problem is, however, that rigid standards also reduce 
the flexibility to reflect genuine business differences in a firm’s accounting decisions. In 
other words, accounting rules introduce noise and bias because it is difficult to restrict 
management discretion without reducing the information content of accounting data. A 
good example is International Accounting Standard (IAS) 38 issued by the IASB. The 
standard requires firms to recognize assets for certain development outlays, but 
requires expensing the preceding research outlays. Since some research expenditures 
clearly have future value4, complying with IAS 38 can lead to distorted accounting 
information. (Palepu et al., 2007, 90-93). 
  
                                                        
4 According to Troberg (2007, 156-157) these cost, in economic sense, represent investment in the future. 
Therefore they should first be capitalized and later on matched with related revenues. 
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Forecast errors 
Many business decisions involve some degree of uncertainty. Because managers do not 
have perfect foresight, they cannot predict future consequences of current transactions 
flawlessly. For example, if the manager estimates that the probability of collecting 
payments from the customers is reasonably certain, firm treats transactions as sales. 
Since actual customer defaults are likely to differ from those that are estimated, 
accounting data typically has noise that arises from forecast errors. (Palepu et al., 2007, 
93) 
Managers’ accounting choices  
Managers may be tempted to exercise their accounting discretion to achieve certain 
objectives. First, if a firm is close to violating its debt covenants, managers are likely to 
choose accounting policies that reduce the probability of covenant violation. Second, 
managers have incentives to adopt accounting policies that maximize their 
compensation. Third, managers may make accounting decisions to influence investor 
perceptions in corporate control contests (e.g. hostile takeovers). Fourth, tax 
considerations may affect reporting choices. Fifth, managers may make accounting 
choices to influence regulatory outcomes (e.g. to prevent infringements of competition 
laws), capital markets or important stakeholders (e.g. labor unions). Sixth, the 
competitive environment of the company may influence its reporting choices, such as 
disclosing detailed segment data. The company may also discourage new entrants by 
making profit-decreasing account choices. (Palepu et al., 2007, 93-94). 
2.2 Debt markets 
There are two main sources of debt: private debt provided by banks or other financial 
institutions, and public debt that is sought directly from investors. Debt contracts 
typically have multiple contract terms: besides defining interest rate and maturity, 
lenders can also set debt covenants and require collateral. This section discusses the 
sources of debt and debt contracting terms. 
2.2.1 Sources of debt 
There are two primary sources of debt financing: private and public debt markets. 
Private debt is typically provided by banks or other financial institutions. Public debt is 
sought directly from investors, for example through sales of commercial paper or 
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through the issuance of bonds. (Palepu et al., 2007, 402-403). Lenders in these two 
markets differ e.g. with respect to their access to information, ability to monitor the 
borrower, flexibility in resetting contract terms and the cost of renegotiating the 
contract. 
Since public debt is typically held by dispersed arm’s-length investors, monitoring the 
debt and renegotiating the contract is difficult because of coordination and free-rider 
problems. In contrast, private lenders, such as banks, have superior access to 
information and they make investments in monitoring the borrower. Consequently, 
they face lower renegotiation cost and are able to write detailed and tailor-made 
contracts, breaches of which trigger renegotiation. (Bharath et al., 2008).  
Syndicated loans are private debt securities that also have features of public debt, such 
as credit ratings and a secondary market (Wittenberg-Moerman, 2009). In Europe, 
however, the secondary market is relatively nascent and illiquid, especially compared 
with that in the U.S. (Standard & Poor's, 2010). In a syndicated loan, two or more 
lenders agree jointly to make a loan to a borrower. Every syndicate member has a 
separate claim on the debtor, although there is a single loan agreement contract. The 
syndicate is led by one or several arrangers that are responsible for bringing together 
the syndicate that lends money at the specified set of terms. Corporate borrowers 
usually have their relationship banks at the core of the syndicate and they may bring in 
other institutions according to the size, complexity and the pricing of the loan. 
Arranging a syndicated loan is typically quicker and less costly (in terms of set-up fees) 
than a bond issuance. (Casu et al., 2006, 90-91). 
2.2.2 Terms of debt 
Interest rate 
In general, the interest rate increases with the riskiness of the borrower. When 
determining the interest rate, it is important to assure that the yield on the loan is 
sufficient to cover (1) the lender’s cost of borrowed funds, (2) the lenders cost of 
administering and servicing the loan, (3) a premium for exposure to default risk, and (4) 
at least a normal return on the equity capital necessary to support the lending 
operation. (Palepu et al., 2007,411-413). 
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Maturity 
Short-term loans carry the advantage that the lender can frequently review the 
borrower and make adjustments to the terms of the loan when necessary (Palepu et al., 
2007, 406). Borrowers with high probability of having insufficient cash flows therefore 
often have no choice but to borrow short term (Stohs & Mauer, 1996).  Renegotiation, 
however, imposes various transaction costs. The academic literature suggests that small 
firms with lower transaction costs are likely to issue short-term debt, while large firms 
are more likely to issue long-term debt to take advantage of economies of scale. (Alcock 
et al., 2012).  
Covenants 
The covenants represent a mechanism for ensuring that the business will remain as 
strong as the two parties anticipated at the time the loan was granted. The lender may, 
for example, require that the borrower maintains certain level of net worth, or a 
minimum coverage ratio. The lender can also set covenants that restrict certain actions, 
such as other borrowing activity, pledging assets to other lenders, selling of substantial 
part of assets, engaging in mergers or acquisitions, and payment of dividends. Violation 
of a covenant can cause immediate acceleration of the debt payment. In most cases, 
however, lender uses it as an opportunity to re-examine the situation and either waive 
the violation or renegotiate the loan. (Palepu et al., 2007, 410-411).  
Securitization 
If the firm has suitable collateral available, it may be able to reduce its borrowing costs 
by committing not to sell assets. It can do so credibly by securing the debt contract. A 
debt contract is said to be secured if the borrower pledges assets as security until the 
loan is paid in full. When debt is secured, the firm cannot dispose of the pledged assets 
without borrowers’ approval. Moreover, if the firm files for bankruptcy, secured 
creditors acquire title to the pledged assets prior to any other claimant. The advantage 
of secured debt is that it is typically not as expensive to monitor as other forms of bond 
covenants. (Morellec, 2001). 
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2.3 Credit ratings 
The purpose of credit ratings is to provide objective assessment of the creditworthiness 
of a borrower. Credit ratings are provided by rating agencies such as Moody’s and 
Standards & Poor’s, and they play an important role in the corporate debt markets. 
Adjusting financial statements to better fit the rating agencies’ analytical purposes is a 
central part of the credit rating analysis. This section discusses credit ratings and credit 
rating agencies’ financial statement adjustments. 
2.3.1 Credit ratings and credit risk 
Credit ratings are opinions about credit risk. They express the rating agency’s opinion 
about the ability and willingness of a debt issuer to meet its financial obligations in full 
and on time (Standard & Poor's, 2011). The purpose of credit ratings is to provide 
objective, consistent and simple measures of creditworthiness. For a typical investor 
(e.g. bondholder) it is difficult to assess the credit risk and monitor the ongoing 
activities of the debt issuer. Rating agencies, on the other hand, have economies of scale 
and expertise to perform these tasks. Ratings can thus help reduce the information 
asymmetry between debt issuers and investors. As a result, credit ratings, in aggregate, 
lower the costs of borrowing and lending and increase overall market efficiency for both 
issuers and investors (Moody's, 2002).  
Credit ratings play an important role in corporate financing and investment decisions. A 
firm that can issue higher rated bonds can usually obtain debt at better terms than a 
firm that issue only lower rated bonds. The two major rating services for corporate debt 
are Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s (S&P). (Blume et al., 1998). The rating schemes used 
by these two firms are presented in Table 1. 
Loan pricing may vary according to factors such as the type of borrower, purpose of the 
loan, and whether the loan is secured or not. Typically, however, the size of margin (i.e. 
spread over LIBOR or some other benchmark rate) increases with credit risk. Triple-A 
rated loans have the lowest credit risk and thus have the lowest margins. Loans that 
have a credit rating less that BBB are regarded as speculative, making these types of 
credit most costly. (Casu et al., 2006, 92-93). 
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TABLE 1: CREDIT RATING SYMBOLS 
    
Moody’s S&P Quality of issue  
Aaa AAA Highest quality. Very small risk of default 
IN
V
E
ST
M
E
N
T
 G
R
A
D
E
 
Aa1 
Aa2 
Aa3 
AA+ 
AA 
AA- 
High quality. Small risk of default. 
A1 
A2 
A3 
A+ 
A 
A- 
High medium. Strong attributes, but potentially vulnerable. 
Baa1 
Baa2 
Baa3 
BBB+ 
BBB 
BBB- 
Medium quality. Currently adequate, but potentially unreliable. 
Ba1 
Ba2 
Ba3 
BB+ 
BB 
BB- 
Some speculative element. Long-run prospects questionable. 
SP
E
C
U
L
A
T
IV
E
 G
R
A
D
E
 
B1 
B2 
B3 
B+ 
B 
B- 
Able to pay currently, but at risk of default at the future. 
Caa1 
Caa2 
Caa3 
CCC+ 
CCC 
CCC- 
Poor quality. Clear danger of default. 
Ca CC High speculative quality. May be in default. 
C C Lowest rated. Poor prospects of repayment. 
- D In default. 
 
Source: Casu et al., (2006, 93); Moody's, (2009); Standard & Poor's, (2009) 
 
2.3.2 Financial statement adjustments as a part of the rating process 
Adjusting financial statements is a fundamental part of credit rating process for rating 
agencies such as Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s (S&P). According to Moody’s (2005), 
the purpose of financial statement adjustments is to “better reflect, for analytical 
purposes, the underlying economics of transactions and events and to improve 
comparability of a company’s financial statements with those of its peers.” S&P 
(Standard & Poor's, 2007) states that the objectives of specific adjustments can be 
classified into one or more of the following categories: 
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 Facilitate comparability 
 Facilitate period-over-period comparisons 
 Better reflect underlying economics 
 Normalize different estimates and assumptions 
 Adjust for inconsistencies within accounting treatments 
 Better reflect creditor’s risks and rights 
 Enhance forecasting 
Both Moody’s and S&P emphasize that their adjustments do not imply that companies’ 
reported financial statements fail to comply with accounting standards. Moody’s (2005) 
notes that their goal is to enhance the analytical value of financial statement, not to 
assess compliance with rules. According to S&P (2007), adjustments reflect the 
fundamental difference between accounting and analysis: the accountant must find one 
number to use in presenting the financial data, while the analyst’s task is to pick apart 
the numbers in order to depict situation differently for a specific purpose or to gain 
another vantage point. 
The adjustments made by Moody’s (2005) and S&P (2007) can be divided into two main 
categories: Standard adjustments are calculated systematically (e.g. using standardized 
worksheets), and are applied routinely for the majority of companies. Non-standard 
adjustments, in turn, are applied at the discretion of rating analysts. Moody’s (2005) 
notes that its standard adjustments are mostly based on publicly available information, 
but non-standard adjustments may also incorporate private information. Similarly, S&P 
(2007) states that their adjustments are occasionally based (in whole or in part) on 
nonpublic information, but that their published data refers only to publicly available 
information. 
Batta et al. (2011) note that the adjustments used by Moody’s and S&P are very similar 
to recommendations in financial analysis textbooks, and are representative of 
adjustments practices most widely accepted by profession and academe. The rest of this 
section presents the standard adjustments as they are defined in Moody’s (2005) rating 
methodology for non-financial companies reporting under IFRS. An overview of the 
reporting problems related to adjustments is given first, and is followed by Table 2, 
which describes in more detail the impact the adjustments have on the financial 
statements. 
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Defined benefit pensions 
Accounting standards permit artificial smoothing of pension expense, which can distort 
the measurement of pension expense and liabilities. Moreover, accounting standards 
require companies to classify cash contributions to the pension trust as an operating 
cash flow, even though these contributions (when they reduce plan underfunding) in 
economic sense represent reduction of debt, which is a financing activity. Moody’s 
views the underfunded portion of the pension plan as debt-like obligation, and adjusts 
financial statements accordingly. In addition, Moody’s aims at improving comparability 
between pre-funded and unfunded pension schemes. This is done by simulating a pre-
funding of pension obligations for those companies that have unfunded pension 
arrangements. (Moody's, 2005). 
Operating leases 
Pay-as-you-go accounting for operating leases often does not reflect the true nature of 
these lease obligations. Moody’s lists three main reasons for adjusting operating leases. 
First, companies do not recognize debt, even though failure to make a lease payment 
can trigger default, as if the obligation was debt. Second, incurring operation lease 
obligations reduces a company’s borrowing capacity. Third, in the absence of a lease 
financing option, the company would likely to borrow money and buy the asset. 
Consequently, Moody’s capitalizes operating leases, i.e. recognizes debt and an 
increases fixed assets. (Moody's, 2005). 
Capitalized interest 
Under certain circumstances, companies are allowed to capitalize interest cost as a part 
of the cost of a qualifying asset. Moody’s views capitalized interest cost as a cost of 
obtaining finance, and expenses all capitalized interest costs. (Moody's, 2005). 
Capitalized development costs 
Capitalization of product development costs is not permitted under US GAAP, but is 
mandatory under IFRS when certain criteria are met. In addition, capitalization 
produces an intangible asset, which is difficult to value and can sometimes have a 
relatively short life. Moody’s views capitalized development costs as an operating 
expense, and expenses all capitalized development costs. (Moody's, 2005). 
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Interest expense related to discounted long-term liabilities other than debt 
Under IFRS, certain long-term liabilities other than debt are discounted to present 
value, and the unwinding of the discount is recorded as an interest expense. This 
reporting distorts the relationship between interest expense and debt, and undermines 
the comparability of companies. Consequently, Moody’s reclassifies the interest expense 
arising from discounting to operating expenses. (Moody's, 2005). 
Hybrid securities 
Contrary to their accounting treatment, hybrid securities are generally not pure debt or 
pure equity. Moody’s assigns weights to the debt and equity features of the security (e.g. 
75% debt and 25% equity) and reclassifies them accordingly. (Moody's, 2005). 
Securitizations 
In certain circumstances, companies can report the transfer of financial assets (e.g. 
receivables) to securitization trust as sale. If company still retains significant risks 
related to these transferred assets, which is often the case, Moody’s views the 
securitization transactions as collateralized borrowing, and adds debt and assets to the 
balance sheet. (Moody's, 2005). 
Consistent measurement of funds from operations  
When reporting the cash flow from operations, IFRS companies using the indirect 
method can choose the starting point for the calculation between net income, operating 
profit and pretax income. This flexibility causes inconsistent measurement of funds 
from operations (FFO, i.e. cash from operations before changes in working capital). 
Moody’s adjusts working capital so that calculation of FFO is consistent with those 
companies that use net income as a starting point for their cash flow statement. 
(Moody's, 2005). 
Unusual and non-recurring items 
Unusual and non-recurring transactions, if not separately considered, can create a 
misleading impression about a company’s financial situation and future trends. 
Consequently, Moody’s captures the effect of these transactions and events in special 
income statement and cash flow statement captions. Moody’s computation of key ratios 
excludes these captions. (Moody's, 2005). 
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TABLE 2: FINANCIAL STATEMENT ADJUSTMENTS 
 
Adjustment Balance sheet Income statement Cash flow statement 
    
Defined benefit pensions 
(PART 1: Pre-funded and 
unfunded schemes) 
The underfunded defined pension obligation is 
recognized as debt. All other pension assets 
and liabilities recognized under IFRS are 
removed. 
All pension costs are reversed. The operating 
cost of the pension plan is recognized as 
service cost. The related interest cost is 
reclassified from other income/expense to 
interest expense. Actual losses or gains on 
pension assets are added or subtracted in other 
income/expense (but only in an amount up to 
the interest cost after attributing interest 
expense to pension-related debt). 
Only the service cost is recognized as an 
outflow from CFO. Other employer cash 
pension contributions are reclassified as CFF. 
    
Defined benefit pensions 
(PART 2: Incremental 
adjustments to unfunded 
schemes) 
The portion of the debt recognized in Part 1 is 
reversed, and corresponding increase in equity 
is recorded. This “equity credit” simulates a 
pre-funding of pension obligations. 
Interest expense is aligned with the debt 
adjustment. 
- 
    
Operating leases Operating leases are capitalized by adding both 
debt and fixed assets. 
Operating expense (or COGS and SG&A 
expenses proportionally) are reclassified so 
that one-third of the rent expense is 
reclassified to interest expense and the 
remaining two-thirds rent to “Depreciation – 
Capitalized Operating Leases” (a component of 
operating profit). 
Principal portion of lease payments is 
reclassified from CFO to FFO. 
    
Capitalized interest PP&E is reduced by the amount of interest 
capitalized during the period. Deferred taxes 
are adjusted accordingly. Retained earnings 
are reduced by the after-tax cost of the 
additional interest expense recognized on the 
income statement. 
Interest expense is increased by the amount of 
interest capitalized during the period. 
Applicable tax expense is reduced. 
Capitalized interest is reclassified from CFI to 
CFO. 
    
Capitalized development 
costs 
Intangible assets are reduced by the 
cumulative amount of capitalized development 
costs. Deferred taxes are adjusted accordingly. 
Retained earnings are reduced by the 
cumulative amount of capitalized development 
costs, net of tax. 
Operating expenses are increased by the 
amount of capitalized interest costs for the 
period. Amortization charge related to the 
capitalized development costs is removed. 
Applicable tax expense is adjusted. 
Capitalized development costs are reclassified 
from CFI to CFO. 
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TABLE 2 (CONTINUED) 
 
Adjustment Balance sheet Income statement Cash flow statement 
    
Interest expense related 
to discounted long-term 
liabilities other than debt 
- Operating expenses are increased by the cost of 
unwinding the discounted liabilities. Interest 
expense is reduced by that same amount. 
- 
    
Hybrid securities Hybrid securities are reclassified in accordance 
with the weights assigned to their debt and 
equity features (e.g. 75% debt and 25% 
equity). 
If debt instrument has an “equity-like” 
component, the ratable amount of interest 
expense is reclassified to dividends. If equity 
instrument has a “debt-like” component, the 
ratable amount of dividends is reclassified to 
interest expense. 
If interest expense is reclassified as dividends, 
the cash flow is reclassified from CFO to CFI, 
and vice versa. 
    
Securitizations Debt is increased by the ending balance of 
uncollected or unrealized assets that are 
transferred in the securitization arrangement. 
The assets of appropriate category are 
increased by the same amount. 
Interest expense is imputed on the amount of 
additional debt recognized (at the company’s 
short-term borrowing rate). Other expenses 
are reduced by the same amount. 
Upon the initial derecognition of assets, the 
CFO is reclassified to CFF.  If the amount of 
uncollected receivables in the securitization 
increases, the amount of that increase is 
reclassified from CFO to CFF. If it decreases, 
the amount of that decrease is reclassified 
from CFF to CFO. 
    
Consistent measurement 
of FFO 
- - If cash flow statement starting point is pre-tax 
income or operating profit, working capital is 
adjusted by the difference between current tax 
expense and tax paid. If the starting point is 
operating profit, working capital is also 
adjusted by the difference between net interest 
expense (including capitalized interest) and 
net interest paid. 
    
Unusual and non-
recurring items 
Adjusted only if unusual or non-recurring items 
could have material impact. 
The effects of unusual or non-recurring items 
(net of the related tax effect) are reclassified to 
a special income statement caption that is 
below net profit after tax. They are excluded 
when computing key ratios. 
The effects of unusual or non-recurring 
operating cash inflows and outflows are 
reclassified to a special caption in the CFO. 
They are excluded when computing key ratios. 
Notes: PP&E is the property, plant and equipment. COGS is the cost of goods sold. SG&A is selling, general and administrative expenses. CFO is operating cash flow. CFI is investing 
cash flow. CFF is financing cash flow.   
 
source: Moody’s (2005) 
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3 PRIOR RESEARCH AND LITERATURE ON ACCOUNTING QUALITY 
AND ITS IMPACT ON DEBT CONTRACTING 
3.1 Accruals quality 
Sloan (1996) separates reported earnings into cash flow and accrual components. He 
examines these two components separately and finds that the accrual component has 
lower persistence than the cash flow component. This finding suggests that high level of 
accruals is associated with low quality of earnings. Additionally, Sloan (1996) 
documents – contrary to the traditional efficient market theory – that investors fail to 
correctly distinguish between the different persistence levels of these two earnings 
components. Consequently, firms with relatively high accrual levels experience negative 
abnormal stock returns (and low accrual firms positive abnormal stock returns) that 
are concentrated around future earnings announcements. 
Hirshleifer et al. (2004) use a balance sheet based approach to measure the difference 
between cash and earnings profitability (i.e. total accruals). More specifically, they 
demonstrate that the level of net operating assets (NOA)5 represents the difference 
between cumulative earnings and cumulative free cash flow over time. Hirshleifer et al. 
(2004) note that accumulation of earnings is not sustainable unless there is a 
commensurate accumulation of free cash flows. A high level of NOA therefore indicates 
that the past accounting performance has been good, but equally good performance is 
unlikely to be sustained in the future. Hirshleifer et al. (2004) hypothesize that 
investors often fail to discount for this sustainability effect, which leads to excessive 
investor optimism and systematic errors in market prices. Consistent with this 
hypothesis, they find that firms with high net operating assets earn negative long-run 
abnormal returns. 
Even though the mispricing of accruals was first studied in the context of equity 
markets, subsequent research has shown that accruals are relevant also in the debt 
markets. For example Bhojraj and Swaminathan (2009) point out that since debt 
payments are made from cash flows – not from reported earnings – also lenders should 
                                                        
5 Hirshleifer et al. (2004) measure NOA as the difference between operating assets (total assets – cash and 
short-term investments) and operating liabilities (total assets – total debt – minority interest – preferred 
stock – common equity) scaled by lagged total assets (assets at the beginning of financial year). 
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pay attention to cash flows and earnings quality. They examine the accruals anomaly in 
bond markets and find that corporate bonds of firms with low operating accruals 
perform better than bonds of high operating accruals firms. Their results therefore 
support the theory that mispricing of accruals documented in equity markets also 
extends to bond markets. 
Francis et al. (2005) show that higher-quality accruals are associated with lower cost of 
debt. Moreover, Francis et al. (2005) examine whether the pricing of accruals quality 
differs depending on the source of accruals quality. They find that the discretionary 
accruals component (i.e. accruals that represent managerial choices) has significantly 
smaller pricing effect than the innate accruals component (i.e. accruals that are driven 
by the firm’s business model and operating environment). They hypothesize that 
discretionary accruals component reflects a mixture of information-risk decreasing and 
information-risk increasing effects6, and that these conflicting effects lower the 
discretionary accruals’ overall cost of capital impact. Finally, Francis et al. (2005) 
conclude that their findings support the view that information risk is a priced risk factor 
in capital markets. 
Bharath et al. (2008) show that high-quality accounting, measured with the magnitude 
of operating accruals, lowers the cost of debt. Moreover, they demonstrate that 
accounting quality affects the choice of debt market, as well as the debt contract design. 
Bharath et al. (2008) show that firms with poorer accounting quality are more likely to 
choose private debt than public debt. Additionally, they document significant 
differences in the debt contract design between these two markets. In the case of 
private debt, there is substantial variation in all contract terms based on variation in 
borrower accounting quality: firms with low accounting quality pay higher interest 
rates, obtain shorter maturities and are more likely to post collateral.  In public debt 
contracts, however, the higher risk from poorer accounting quality is entirely reflected 
in the interest spread. Bharath et al. (2008) hypothesize that these distinctions result 
from institutional differences between private and public lenders. Because private 
                                                        
6 Discretion allows reporting choices that can be used to improve earnings as a performance indicator. 
However, discretion can also be exploited to manage earnings in order to extract opportunistic gains. 
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lenders (e.g. banks) have superior information access7 and recontracting flexibility 
compared to public lenders (e.g. bondholders), they are better able to fine-tune debt 
contracts on both price and non-price dimensions. Finally, Bharath et al. (2008) 
conjecture that accounting quality proxies for the information risk associated with 
estimating future cash flows of the firm, and that this information risk is priced 
incremental to borrower default risk. 
3.2 Completeness of accounting information and disclosure quality 
Duffie and Lando (2001) develop a theoretical model that analyses the economic 
consequences of accounting quality in the secondary corporate bond markets. More 
specifically, they show that imperfect information affects the level and shape of term 
structures of yield spreads8 on corporate bonds. Their logic is as follows: Bond prices 
often drop abruptly at or around the time of default, because default “surprises” 
investors with imperfect information. If the investors had perfect information, there 
would be no surprises, and bond prices would converge continuously to their default-
contingent values. Consequently, Duffie and Lando (2001) demonstrate that with 
perfect information, yield spreads for surviving firms are zero at zero maturity, but 
eventually climb rapidly with maturity for risky firms. Furthermore, they show that 
with imperfect information, the uncertainty about the default probability of a firm 
increases. As a result, yield spreads become positive at zero maturity, and their 
variation with maturity is more moderate. 
Consistent with Duffie and Lando (2001), Yu (2005) finds that firms with high quality 
disclosures have lower credit spreads in secondary bond markets, and that this 
“transparency spread” is especially large among short-term bonds. Furthermore, Yu 
(2005) shows that even though credit ratings incorporate some information about 
accounting quality, they do not fully absorb the effect of information disclosure. 
Consequently, among issuers with the same credit rating, those with higher disclosure 
quality have lower credit spreads. 
                                                        
7 Private debt holders often base their lending decisions on proprietary information that is unavailable to 
the public (e.g. internal financial forecasts, detailed data on sales and inventory and capital expenditure 
budgets) (Armstrong et al., 2010, 214). 
8 The “term structure” refers to the relationship between the term to a maturity of a bond and its yield to  
maturity. The yield includes not only the interest income, but also any anticipated gain or loss due to the 
current price being lower or greater than the maturity value. The shape and level of the yield curve 
therefore reflect market’s expectations of the future. (Casu et al., 2006, 457). 
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Also a number of other studies have used disclosure quality as a proxy for accounting 
quality. Sengupta (1998) finds a significant negative association between firms’ 
disclosure quality and borrowing cost. He concludes that firms that constantly make 
timely and informative (i.e. high quality) disclosures are less likely to withhold value-
relevant unfavorable information, and are therefore charged a lower risk premium. 
Leuz and Verrechia (2000) document that increased disclosure reduces information 
asymmetry and thereby lowers firms’ cost of capital. They examine German firms that 
have switched from the local to an international reporting regime (IAS or US GAAP), and 
show that this commitment to substantially increased level of disclosure is associated 
with lower bid-ask spreads. 
3.3 Internal control reports 
Under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, US public companies are required to assess the 
effectiveness of their internal controls over financial reporting and to provide periodic 
auditor-attested evaluations of their internal control effectiveness (Kim et al., 2011). 
Internal control reports thus provide a rigorous assessment of the reliability of a firm’s 
financial reporting (Costello & Wittenberg-Moerman, 2011). Kim et al. (2011) examine 
how the disclosure of material internal control weakness (ICW) affects bank loan 
contracting, while Costello and Wittenberg-Moerman (2011) study the impact of ICW in 
the syndicated loan markets. Both studies show that ICW firms pay higher interest rates 
and face higher likelihood of a loan being secured than non-ICW firms. Costello and 
Wittenberg-Moerman (2011) further document that the number of financial covenants 
imposed by lenders decreases following ICW. They conjecture that when an ICW 
indicates that reporting quality is low, lenders are likely to trade off more timely 
financial ratios for more reliable credit ratings, and to move toward security and price 
protection. 
Dhaliwal et al. (2011) focus on the impact of ICW in the public debt market. Consistent 
with Kim et al. (2011) and Costello and Wittenberg-Moerman (2011), they find that a 
firm’s cost of debt increases after it discloses an ICW. Moreover, Dhaliwal et al. (2011) 
document that this result is more pronounced for firms that are not monitored by credit 
rating agencies or banks, and that the effect of bank monitoring seems to be especially 
important. 
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3.4 Conservatism 
A number of studies discuss accounting conservatism9 and its implications for debt 
markets. Watts (2003) suggests that conservative accounting constraints overpayments 
to managers and shareholders, and thus protects the claims of debt holders and 
facilitates more efficient debt contracting. Although this view has received some 
criticism (e.g. Gigler et al., 2009; Guay & Verrecchia, 2006), the persistent influence of 
conservatism in accounting suggests that it can offer economic benefits (Bushman & 
Piotroski, 2006). Consistent with this perspective, Ahmed et al. (2002) show that 
conservative accounting helps to mitigate bondholder-shareholder conflicts over 
dividend policy. Moreover, they document that firms that adopt more conservative 
accounting practices have, on average, lower debt costs and more favorable debt 
ratings. Also findings of Zhang (2008), Hong et al. (2009) and Wittenberg-Moerman 
(2009) suggest that conservative accounting is associated with more efficient debt 
contracting and lower cost of debt. 
3.5 Evidence from syndicated loan markets 
Many accounting quality studies exploit the recent rapid growth in the syndicated debt 
market. Sufi (2007) shows that information asymmetries affect the syndicate structure. 
When borrowers are opaque, the lead arrangers retain a larger portion of the loan, and 
form a more concentrated syndicate. By increasing their risk exposure to the loan, the 
lead arrangers signal to the other syndicate members that they are actively 
investigating and monitoring the borrower. Ball et al. (2008) document similar results. 
Moreover, they find that when borrowers’ accounting information possesses high debt-
contracting value (i.e. provides timely and informative signals about their credit 
quality), it helps to mitigate the information asymmetry problems between the lead 
arranger and other syndicate participants. As a result, lead arrangers are able to hold 
smaller proportions of loans, and form a less concentrated syndicate. 
Wittenberg-Moerman (2008; 2009) demonstrates that on the secondary syndicated 
loan market, the bid-ask spread in the loan trade is strongly associated with a 
                                                        
9 Basu (1997, 4) defines conservatism as “capturing accountants’ tendency to require a higher degree of 
verification for recognizing good news than bad news in financial statements.” Givoly and Hayn (2000), in 
turn, give a more elaborate definition. They define conservatism as “a selection criterion between 
accounting principles that leads to the minimization of cumulative reported earnings by slower revenue 
recognition, faster expense recognition, lower asset valuation, and higher liability valuation.” 
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borrower’s information opacity. Wittenberg-Moerman (2008) shows that loans of 
public firms, loans with an available credit rating, loans of profit firms and loans 
syndicated by more reputable arrangers are traded at lower bid–ask spreads. Moreover, 
Wittenberg-Moerman (2009) finds that information asymmetry affects debt contracting 
terms. She shows that a higher bid-ask spread on a borrower’s traded loans leads into 
higher interest rates and shorter loan maturities on its subsequently issued loans. She 
concludes that higher accounting quality reduces information asymmetry and therefore 
lowers cost of debt. Finally, she notes that a shorter maturity induces more frequent 
refinancing of loans to lower accounting quality borrowers, which allows lenders to 
more frequently renegotiate the loan contractual terms. 
3.6 Financial statement adjustments 
Kraft (2011) documents that a major rating agency (Moody’s) makes extensive 
adjustments to US GAAP financial statements. She finds that most significant 
adjustments, relative to total assets, are those incorporating the impact of off-balance 
sheet financing arrangements, such as operating leases. Kraft (2011) shows that long-
term debt is adjusted upward in 96% of the sample firms (with the median increase of 
6% relative to total assets). This higher level of indebtedness also has a significant 
impact on the adjusted leverage and coverage ratios. The total debt leverage ratio (total 
debt divided by total assets), for example, experiences a median increase of 14%. 
Moreover, Kraft examines the impact of both “hard” (quantitative) and “soft” 
(qualitative) adjustments on bond yields. She finds that both adjustment types are 
significantly associated with lower ratings and higher bond yields. Kraft (2011) states 
that this evidence is consistent with the view that ratings agencies are, for the most 
part, efficient processors of accounting information. She concludes that the rating 
agency’s financial statement adjustments and its qualitative credit risk assessments are 
not merely “window dressing”, but actually generate more accurate estimates of default 
risk. Nevertheless, she notes that soft adjustments may be too conservative relative to 
bond yields. 
Seppänen et al. (2010) examine the decision usefulness of rating agency’s financial 
statement adjustments in the context of global telecom industry. Consistent with the 
view that adjustments provide useful information and thereby reduce information risk, 
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they document that absolute magnitude of adjustments is significantly and positively 
associated with credit ratings. Moreover, Seppänen et al. (2010) examine whether the 
adjustments provide useful information for equity investors. They show that 
adjustments, especially those related to total debt, are negatively associated with firm 
value. This finding suggest that information incorporated in the adjustments is at least 
implicitly used in equity valuation, and that greater degree of adjustments reflects 
information risk and thus  reduces firm value. However, the results of Seppänen et al. 
(2010) seem to hold mainly for US GAAP reporters. Somewhat surprisingly, there is 
little evidence on the decision usefulness of IFRS adjustments. 
Batta et al. (2011) examine the importance of financial statement recasting for credit 
pricing and credit portfolio loss estimation. They find that adjusted financial ratios have 
superior explanatory power for bond yield spreads over reported ratios. Furthermore, 
they show that this difference remains even when ratings dummies are included in the 
regression. Additionally, Batta et al. (2011) document that some individual adjustment 
categories (off-balance sheet leases, defined benefit pensions and securitized debt) 
provide information that is useful in credit risk assessment, and that the incremental 
explanatory power of individual adjustments does not significantly change when all 
adjustments are examined simultaneously. Overall, the results of Batta et al. (2011) 
indicate that credit markets extract information from adjustments, and that this 
information is at least partly incremental to rating information. 
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4 HYPOTHESES 
When a firm constantly provides timely and informative (i.e. high quality) accounting 
information, it is less likely withhold value-relevant unfavorable information (Sengupta, 
1998). This indicates that high-quality accounting can help to mitigate information 
asymmetry problems between borrowers and lenders: when a firm’s accounting quality 
is high, there is less uncertainty regarding its future, and it is easier for the lenders to 
assess its creditworthiness. In this thesis, I examine whether high accounting quality 
translates into better terms of debt. Figure 3 summarizes my research question. 
FIGURE 3: RESEARCH QUESTION 
 
Consistent with the view that a firm’s reporting practices can affect its debt contracting, 
many recent asset-pricing studies demonstrate that high-quality accounting is 
associated with lower cost of capital (e.g. Easley & O'Hara, 2004; Lambert et al., 2011; 
Lambert et al., 2007; Leuz & Verrecchia, 2005). Moreover, there is empirical evidence 
suggesting that informationally opaque firms are charged a risk premium that is priced 
incremental to borrower default risk (e.g. Bharath et al., 2008; Francis et al., 2005; Yu, 
2005). This leads to the first hypothesis: 
H1:  Firms with high accounting quality pay lower interest rates on their loans 
than firms with low accounting quality.  
Accounting quality is also likely to affect the non-price terms of debt. Shorter loan 
maturities induce more frequent refinancing of debt, and thus renegotiation of debt 
contract terms (Wittenberg-Moerman, 2009). This leads to the second hypothesis: 
H2: Firms with high accounting quality have longer loan maturities than firms 
with low accounting quality. 
High accounting 
quality 
Less information 
asymmetry and 
uncertainty 
Smaller credit 
risk 
Better debt 
terms? 
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If a borrower faces financial distress, holders of secured debt are better protected than 
holders of unsecured debt. Since low-quality accounting numbers are less efficient in 
signaling changes in a borrower’s accounting quality, I expect lenders to demand more 
collateral to compensate for this information risk. This leads to the third hypothesis: 
H3: Firms with high accounting quality are able to obtain loans with less 
securitization than firms with low accounting quality.  
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5 DATA, VARIABLES AND METHODOLOGY 
5.1 Data 
The data used in the empirical analysis is provided by a large, globally operating credit 
rating agency. It comprises balance sheet, income statement and cash flow statement 
information, as well as credit ratings. The special feature of the data is that it includes 
both original (reported by firms) and adjusted (modified by the rating agency) financial 
figures. The original data consists of financial information of 528 companies reporting 
under the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) over the period 2005-
2007 – a total of 1584 firm-year observations. After removing observations with 
missing credit ratings (-435 observations) and missing financial statement information 
(-307 observations), the final sample is reduced to 842 firm-year observations. This 
sample includes data from 371 companies, 61 industries and 47 countries.  The sample 
breakdown by industry and country is presented in the Appendix. 
5.2 Variables 
This section discusses the variables used in the empirical analysis. Dependent variables 
(terms of debt) are presented first, followed by independent variables (accounting 
quality) and control variables. 
5.2.1 Dependent variables: Terms of debt 
The terms of debt analyzed in this thesis are interest cost, securitization and maturity. 
As discussed in the previous chapter, I expect that high accounting quality is associated 
with lower interest rates, less securitization, and longer maturities. 
 LnINTEREST is the natural logarithm of a firm’s effective interest rate, calculated 
as the ratio of interest expense to average debt. 
 SECDEBT is the ratio of secured debt to total debt. 
 LnMATURITY is the natural logarithm of a firm’s debt maturity, calculated as the 
ratio of long-term debt to long-term debt payments. 
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5.2.2 Independent variables 
Two types of variables are used to measure accounting quality: accruals variables and 
adjustment variables. Also variables controlling credit risk, firm size and year, industry 
and country fixed effects are added to the empirical model. 
Accounting quality: Accruals 
Accruals are the difference between earnings and cash flows. Previous research has 
shown that firms with high accruals (i.e. low cash flows relative to earnings) tend to 
have lower future earnings and cash flows than firms with low accruals (e.g. Bhojraj & 
Swaminathan, 2009). Since earnings performance of firms with high accruals is unlikely 
to be sustainable, I expect that high accruals are negatively associated with accounting 
quality and thus negatively associated with terms of debt. I use two accruals measures. 
 ACCRUALS are the deviation between earnings and cash flows during one 
financial year. It is calculated as the difference between net income and cash flow 
from operations, scaled by average total assets. 
 BSBLOAT reflects a full history of earnings and cash flows. It is a cumulative 
measure of the difference over time between accounting value added and cash 
value added – “balance sheet bloat”. It is calculated from the balance sheet as the 
difference between operating assets (total assets – cash and short-term 
investments) and operating liabilities (total assets – total debt – minority 
interest – preferred stock – common equity), scaled by lagged total assets. For a 
more detailed discussion on this variable, see Hirshleifer et al.  (2004). 
Accounting quality: Financial statement adjustments  
As discussed in section 2.3.2, rating agencies routinely adjust financial statements as a 
part of their rating process. The purpose of these adjustments is to make financial 
statement numbers better reflect the underlying economics of a firm. Adjustment can 
therefore be seen as a measure of accounting quality: the more there is need to adjust 
the reported numbers, the lower the accounting quality. I examine the impact of 
adjustments on the financial figures reflecting profitability, leverage, liquidity and free 
cash flow. 
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 PROFITABILITY is the ratio of EBIT (earnings before interest and taxes) to 
average total assets. Since more profitable companies are typically better able to 
meet their financial obligations, I expect profitability-decreasing adjustments to 
be negatively associated with terms of debt.  
 LEVERAGE is the ratio of total debt to total assets. Since more highly levered 
firms are typically riskier, I expect leverage-increasing adjustments to be 
negatively associated with terms of debt. 
 LIQUIDITY is measured with quick ratio, that is, the ratio of cash and cash 
equivalents plus net trade receivables to current liabilities. Since liquidity 
measures a firm’s ability to repay its current liabilities, I expect liquidity-
reducing adjustments to be negatively associated with terms of debt. 
 Free cash flow, FCF, is calculated as operating cash flow minus capital 
expenditures. Since free cash flow represents the cash available to investors, I 
expect FCF-reducing adjustments to be negatively associated with terms of debt. 
All adjustments are calculated as the difference between adjusted figure and reported 
figure, scaled by reported figure. 
Control variables 
RATING is added to the model to control for the credit risk. Following prior literature 
(e.g. Cheng & Subramanyam, 2008; Francis et al., 2005; Kraft, 2011), ratings are 
converted into numerical values, which range from 1 (C) to 21 (Aaa). Since firms with 
high rating as less likely to face financial distress, I expect rating to be positively 
associated with terms of debt. 
LnASSETS is added to the model to control for the firm size. Larger firms tend to be 
older and have more established product lines and more varied sources of revenues and 
are therefore less risky (Blume et al., 1998). Consequently, I expect size to be positively 
associated with terms of debt.  
YEAR, INDUSTRY and COUNTRY fixed effects are controlled by including dummy 
variables to the model. 
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TABLE 3: DEFINITION OF VARIABLES 
PANEL A – Dependent variables: Terms of debt 
   
LnINTEREST Natural logarithm 
of effective interest 
rate 
= Ln [ Interest expense / Average debt ], where 
  
Average debt =  Average of beginning and ending 
total debt 
    
SECDEBT Secured debt to 
Total debt 
= Secured debt / Total debt 
   
LnMATURITY Natural logarithm 
of debt maturity 
= Ln [ Long-term debt / Long-term debt payments ] 
PANEL B – Accounting quality: Accruals 
   
ACCRUALS Accruals = [ Net income – Cash flow from operations ] / Average  
assets, where 
  
 Average assets =  Average of beginning and ending  
total assets 
    
BSBLOAT Net operating 
assets, “Balance 
sheet bloat” 
= [ Operating assets – Operating liabilities ] / Lagged  
assets, where 
  
 Operating 
assets  
= Total assets – Cash and 
short-term investments 
 Operating 
liabilities  
= Total assets – Total debt – 
Preferred stock – Minority 
interest – Common equity 
   Lagged assets  = Beginning total assets 
PANEL C –  Accounting quality:  Financial statement adjustments 
   
Adj% Item Amount of 
adjustment 
= [ Adjusted item – Reported item ] / Reported item, where 
items are 
   
 PROFITABILITY = [ EBIT / Average total assets ] 
 LEVERAGE = [ Total debt / Total assets ] 
 LIQUIDITY 
= [Cash & cash equivalents + Net trade receivables] / 
Current liabilities 
 FCF = Cash flow from operations - CAPEX 
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TABLE 3 (CONTINUED) 
PANEL D – Control variables: Credit risk, size and year, industry and country fixed effects 
   
RATING Long-term credit 
rating 
= Long-term credit rating converted into numerical 
values from 1 (C) to 21 (Aaa) 
   
LnASSETS Natural logarithm of 
Total assets 
= Ln [Total assets] 
   
YEAR Year dummies Dummy variable that takes value 1 or 0 
INDUSTRY Industry dummies Dummy variable that takes value 1 or 0 
COUNTRY Country dummies Dummy variable that takes value 1 or 0 
   
Notes: EBIT is Earning before interest and taxes. CAPEX is capital expenditure. In order to avoid 
unnecessary loss of observations, missing values of following items are treated as zeros: Secured debt, 
Preferred stock, Minority interest. 
 
5.3 Methodology 
5.3.1 Ordinary least squares (OLS) regression  
The empirical analysis in thesis utilizes ordinary least squares (OLS) regression model. 
The general form of OLS regression model can be written as follows: 
                              (1) 
where 
 Yi  is the ith observation on the dependent variable 
 X1i, X2i, … Xki are the ith observations on each of the k regressors 
 β1 … βk are slope coefficients that provide an estimate of the influence of each X 
variable on Y, holding the all the other X variables constant 
 β0  is the intercept, i.e. the expected value of Y when all the X’s equal zero 
 ui  is the error term 
Given a set of n observations on Y, X1, … , Xk, least square analysis is used to fit the 
equation (2) 
                               (2) 
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so that the sum of the squares of the residuals, given by (3), is minimized. 
 
   
 
   
          
 
 
   
                       
 
 
   
 
(3) 
(Dougherty, 2002, Ch. 4; Stock & Watson, 2003, Ch. 5) 
5.3.2 Regression model design 
Figure 4 summarizes the three regression models used in this thesis. Model 0 is a 
benchmark model that only includes the control variables. Variables describing 
accounting quality are added to models 1 and 2. Model 1 incorporates control variables 
and accruals variables, while model 2 also includes financial statement adjustment 
variables.  Each model is run separately for the three dependent variables LnINTEREST, 
SECDEBT and LnMATURITY. 
FIGURE 4: REGRESSION MODEL DESIGN 
   
Dependent 
variables 
 Independent variables 
       
Terms of debt = 
Control 
variables 
+ 
Accounting 
quality: 
Accruals 
+ 
Accounting quality: 
Financial statement 
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YEAR 
INDUSTRY 
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BSBLOAT 
 Adj% PROFITABILITY 
Adj% LEVERAGE 
Adj% LIQUIDITY 
Adj% FCF 
 
 
Model 0  
 
Model 1  
 
Model 2 
 
Figure 4 summarizes the three regression models used in this thesis. All variables are defined in Table 
3. 
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5.3.3 Assessing the regression model 
This section discusses the potential problems related to OLS regressions and assesses 
the validity of the regression models used in this thesis. 
Outliers 
Outliers are observations that are very different from the rest of the data. They are 
typically generated by some unusual factors. When ordinary least square method is 
used, the estimates of the regression parameters can be substantially influenced by a 
few outliers. (Maddala, 1988, 54-55). In order to reduce the influence of outliers, all 
continuous variables in this thesis are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. That is, 
observations below the 1st percentile are set to the 1st percentile, and observations 
above the 99th percentile are set to the 99th percentile. 
One way to detect outliers is to examine standardized residuals. If the model is a poor fit 
of the sample data, the residuals will be large. A general rule is that no more than 5% of 
cases should have absolute values above 2. Another commonly used method is to look at 
Cook’s distance: any value above 1 indicates a case that might be influencing the model. 
(Field, 2005, Ch. 5). Outlier diagnostics for this thesis are reported in Table 4. The table 
shows that percentage of cases with standardized residuals not within the ±2 limit is 
slightly higher than 5% for regression models with LnINTEREST and SECDEBT as 
dependent variables. The maximum values of Cook’s distance, however, are well below 
one in all three models. The diagnostics therefore indicate that outliers are not a major 
concern. 
TABLE 4: OUTLIER DIAGNOSTICS 
  
Dependent variable 
    LnINTEREST SECDEBT LnMATURITY 
Standardized residuals 
   
 Cases with absolute value above 2 46 55 21 
 Cases with absolute value above 2, 
% of the total sample 
5,46 % 6,53 % 2,49 % 
Cook's Distance (maximum) 0,232 0,068 0,121 
    The outlier diagnostics are based on Model 2. The sample consists of 842 firm-year observations. All 
variables are defined in Table 3. 
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Multicollinearity 
Multicollinearity exists when there is a strong correlation between two or more 
predictors in a regression model. As collinearity increases, so do the standard errors of 
coefficients, which in turn affects whether these coefficients are found to be statistically 
significant. That is, high levels of collinearity increase the probability that a good 
predictor will be found non-significant and rejected from the model. Multicollinearity 
also affects the size of R. When the predictors are uncorrelated (i.e. there is no 
multicollinearity), each new variable is likely to account for different variance in the 
outcome to that accounted for by other predictors, which leads to higher R. 
Furthermore, multicollinearity between predictors makes it difficult to assess the 
individual importance of each predictor, and leads to unstable estimates of the 
regression coefficients values. (Field, 2005, 174-175). In practice, all regressions suffer 
from multicollinearity to some extent. (Dougherty, 2002, 128). Multicollinearity is 
therefore a problem only when it is serious. 
One simple way of identifying multicollinearity is to examine the correlation matrix to 
see whether the predictor variables are highly correlated. This method, however, misses 
more subtle forms of multicollinearity (Field, 2005, 175). There are also more 
sophisticated multicollinearity measures. Two commonly used diagnostics are the 
variance inflation factor (VIF) and the condition index (CI). There are no definitive rules 
about what values of VIF and CI should be cause of concern. A general rule of thumb is 
that VIFs exceeding 4 warrant further investigation, while VIFs exceeding 10 are signs 
of serious multicollinearity problem (Simon, 2009). As regards to condition indices, CI 
exceeding 15 is generally thought to be a concern, while CI exceeding 30 is a very 
serious concern (Williams, 2011). 
As can be seen from Panel A of Table 5, all VIF values are well below 10. The variable 
with the highest VIF (4.30) is RATING.  CI values are reported in Panel B. At initial 
examination, the CI values seemed relatively high (>60). Further tests, however, 
revealed that the scaling of the variable LnASSETS has a major impact on the CI, even 
though it does not affect the regression coefficients, or the VIF values. When the scaling 
of LnASSETS is changed, the CI drops below 30. As can be seen from the bottom of Panel 
B, also the large number of control dummies increases the CI. All in all, I conclude that 
multicollinearity is not a serious problem. 
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TABLE 5: MULTICOLLINEARITY DIAGNOSTICS 
 Panel A: Variance inflation factor (VIF) Model 0   Model 1   Model 2 
RATING 4.11 
 
4.21 
 
4.30 
LnASSETS 3.34 
 
3.45 
 
3.48 
ACCRUALS 
  
1.93 
 
1.94 
BSBLOAT 
  
1.76 
 
1.88 
Adj_PROFITABILITY 
    
1.28 
Adj_LEVERAGE 
    
1.84 
Adj_LIQUIDITY 
    
1.51 
Adj_FCF 
    
1.14 
       Year, industry and country fixed effects 
     Maximum VIF 3.62 
 
3.63 
 
3.64 
Average VIF 1.42 
 
1.44 
 
1.46 
Panel B: Condition index (CI)  Model 0   Model 1   Model 2 
The effect of scaling of LnASSETS 
     
 
LnASSETS (USD thousand) 62.78 
 
69.14 
 
70.86 
 
LnASSETS (USD million) 35.04 
 
38.56 
 
39.59 
 
LnASSETS (USD billion) 25.52 
 
28.54 
 
29.30 
       The effect of dropping variables 
     
 
LnASSETS 22.02  24.88  25.64 
 
Year, industry and country fixed effects (when LnASSETS 
is measured in USD billion) 
10.13  12.34  12.96 
 
Ln ASSETS & Year, industry and country fixed effects 7.45  10.13  10.76 
       The table shows the multicollinearity diagnostics for the regression models used in this thesis. The
sample consists of 842 firm-year observations. All variables are defined in Table 3. 
 
Autocorrelation 
In time series data, the value of Y in one period typically is correlated with its value in 
the next period (Stock & Watson, 2003, 434). As a result, the error terms are often not 
determined independently. That is, the error term ut at the time period t is correlated 
with error terms ut+1, ut+2,… and ut-1, ut-2,… and so on. This is called autocorrelation. 
(Maddala, 1988, 186). A common way to detect autocorrelation is to use the Durbin-
Watson test. The test statistic can vary between 0 and 4 with a value of 2 meaning that 
the residuals are uncorrelated. (Field, 2005, 170). For Model 2, the values of Durbin-
Watson statistic are 1.97, 1.96 and 1.93 for dependent variables LnINTEREST, SECDEBT 
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and LnMATURITY, respectively. I therefore conclude that autocorrelation should not be 
a problem. 
Heteroskedasticity 
Heteroskedasticity refers to a situation where the regression residuals do not have a 
constant variance. It is likely to occur when the values of the variables vary substantially 
in different observations. If heteroskedasticity is present, the OLS estimators become 
inefficient. Heteroskedasticity also affects the estimation of standard errors, typically 
causing them to be underestimated (and t statistics overestimated), thus leading to a 
wrong impression of the precision of the regression coefficients.  (Dougherty, 2002, 
220-223). There are two remedies that are often used to solve heteroskedasticity 
problems: the data can either be transformed into logarithms, or the variables can be 
deflated with some measure of size (Maddala, 1988, 172). 
Heteroskedasticity can often be detected by visually examining the plot of Regression 
Standardized Residuals against Regression Standardized Predicted Values. This graph 
should look like a random array of dots evenly dispersed around zero – if it funnels out, 
it is likely that there is heteroskedasticity in the data. (Field, 2005, 202). As can be seen 
from Panel A of Figure 5, there are no signs that the regression models used in this 
thesis suffer from any major heteroskedasticity problems. The graph with SECDEBT as 
dependent variable, however, shows a straight line that is caused by fact that majority 
(over 60%) of the sample firms do not have secured debt. 
Linearity  
OLS regression assumes linear relationship between variables. If the actual relationship 
is non-linear, it limits the generalizability of the results. Linearity problems can also 
often be detected by examining the plot of Regression Standardized Residuals against 
Regression Standardized Predicted Values – if there is any sort of curve in this graph, it 
indicates that the data have broken the assumptions of linearity. (Field, 2005, 170, 202-
203). Panel A of Figure 5 show no indications of such a problem. 
Distribution of error terms 
The differences between the model and observed data should be random, normally 
distributed variables with a mean of 0. That is, the differences much greater than zero 
happen only occasionally.  The normality of residuals can be assessed by visually 
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examining the normal probability plot. The straight line in this plot represents a normal 
distribution – if the observed residuals are very distant from the line, it indicates large 
deviation from normality. (Field, 2005, 170, 204-205). Figure 5, Panel B shows the 
normal probability plots of the data used in this thesis. For the dependent variables 
LnINTEREST and LnMATURITY, the normal probability plot of the residuals is 
approximately a diagonal straight line. The plot with SECDEBT as dependent variable, 
however, has is a slight S-shaped pattern indicating some departure from normality. 
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FIGURE 5: HETEROSKEDASTICITY, LINEARITY AND NORMALITY OF RESIDUALS 
PANEL A: 
Heteroskedasticity and linearity  
 
Panel B: 
Normality of residuals 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The figure shows the graphs of regression standardized residuals plotted against their predicted values 
(Panel A) and the normal probability plots of residuals (Panel B) for the three dependent variables 
LnINTEREST, SECDEBT and LnMATURITY. Figures are based on Model 2. The sample consists of 842 
firm-year observations. All variables are defined in Table 3. 
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6 RESULTS 
6.1 Descriptive statistics 
TABLE 6: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
  Mean Std. Dev. 25 % 50 % 75 %   Model(s) 
        INTERESTa 0.078 0.045 0.051 0.067 0.093
 
0-2
SECDEBT 0.124 0.256 0.000 0.000 0.073 
 
0-2 
MATURITYa 34.900 123.151 2.578 5.462 13.729 
 
0-2 
        RATING 12.837 3.510 10 13 15
 
0-2
ASSETSa (USD million) 21 796 37 630 2 898 8 252 20 514 
 
0-2 
        ACCRUALS -0.032 0.077 -0.069 -0.036 -0.008
 
1-2
BSBLOAT 0.702 0.351 0.501 0.676 0.844 
 
1-2 
        Adj% LEVERAGE 0.459 0.867 0.059 0.183 0.494
 
2
Adj% PROFITABILITY -0.066 0.615 -0.173 -0.062 -0.001 
 
2 
Adj% LIQUIDITY 0.016 0.239 -0.027 -0.010 0.000 
 
2 
Adj% FCF -0.084 1.460 -0.196 0.000 0.092 
 
2 
a In the regressions, natural logarithm of these values (LnINTEREST, LnMATURITY and LnASSETS) are 
used.  
The sample consists of 842 firm-year observations. All variables are defined in Table 3. 
 
Table 6 presents descriptive statistics of the variables used in the regression models. 
The table shows that sample consist primarily of large firms with median (mean) assets 
of about 8.3 billion (21.8 billion) USD. The sample firms also have relatively high credit 
ratings. The median (mean) RATING is 13 (12.8) which corresponds to a rating symbol 
Baa2. That is, over half of the sample firms are considered to be investment grade. 
The median (mean) INTEREST is 6.7% (7.8%). The median firm has no SECDEBT (mean 
12.4%), indicating that sample firms are likely to rely more on debt terms other than 
securitization. The median (mean) MATURITY is 5.5 years (34.9 years). The standard 
deviation of MATURITY is 123.2, which shows that debt maturity varies substantially 
across the sample. 
Median (mean) ACCRUALS are -3.6% (-3.2%). The sign of ACCRUALS is still negative at 
the 75 percentile. It therefore seems that majority of sample firms are more likely 
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underestimate than overestimate their earnings relative to cash flows. The median 
(mean) BSBLOAT is 67.6% (70.2%). The BSBLOAT values are close to those reported by 
Hirshleifer et al. (2004) who also report median and mean values around 70%. 
As can be seen from Table 7 and Figure 6, most adjustments lead to an increase in 
LEVERAGE and decrease in PROFITABILITY and LIQUIDITY. That is, the adjusted 
financial statements, in general, make the sample firms look more risky than the 
reported financial statements.  The adjustments have strong impact especially on 
LEVERAGE (18.3% increase for a median firm) and PROFITABILITY (6.2% decrease for 
a median firm). Their impact on LIQUIDITY is smaller (1.0% decrease for a median 
firm). The adjustments made on FCF are relatively large (median absolute magnitude is 
12.7%), but distributed quite evenly between positive (“up”) and negative (“down”) 
adjustments.  
 
TABLE 7: FREQUENCIES AND ABSOLUTE MAGNITUDES OF FINANCIAL STATEMENT ADJUSTMENTS 
PANEL A: Frequencies of Financial statement adjustments 
  Total      Up Down 
Adj% LEVERAGE 97,1 % 93,7 % 3,4 % 
Adj% PROFITABILITY 98,5 % 22,9 % 75,5 % 
Adj% LIQUIDITY 88,8 % 13,5 % 75,3 % 
Adj% FCF 76,0 % 37,2 % 38,8 % 
PANEL B: Absolute magnitudes of Financial statement adjustments 
 
Mean Std. Dev. 25 % 50 % 75 % 
|Adj% LEVERAGE| 0,464 0,865 0,063 0,184 0,494 
|Adj% PROFITABILITY| 0,251 0,566 0,033 0,096 0,229 
|Adj% LIQUIDITY| 0,071 0,228 0,004 0,017 0,046 
|Adj% FCF| 0,582 1,341 0,002 0,127 0,531 
The sample consists of 842 firm-year observations. All variables are defined in Table 3. 
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FIGURE 6: REPORTED VERSUS ADJUSTED RATIOS 
 
 
The scatter plots show reported versus adjusted LEVERAGE, PROFITABILITY and LIQUIDITY ratios and 
Free Cash Flows (FCF). All variables are defined in Table 3. The 45 degree line is shown for reference. 
 
6.2 Correlation analysis 
A correlation is a measure of the linear relationship between variables. The value of a 
correlation coefficient lies between -1 and +1. A coefficient of +1 indicates a perfect 
positive correlation, -1 indicates a perfect negative correlation and 0 indicates that 
there is no linear relationship. Two commonly used correlation measures are the 
Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient and the Spearman’s rank correlation 
coefficient. The Pearson correlation assumes that variables are measured on interval 
scales. Additionally, testing the significance of the Pearson’s correlation requires the 
data to be normally distributed. Spearman’s correlation, on the other hand, works by 
first ranking the data and can therefore be used also for non-normally distributed data. 
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Both Pearson’s and Spearman’s correlation coefficients are bivariate. That is, they 
measure the relationship between two variables without controlling the effect of any 
other additional variables. It is also important to note that correlation coefficients give 
no indication of the direction of causality. (Field, 2005, Ch. 4). 
Table 8 presents both Pearson (lower left) and Spearman (upper right) correlation 
coefficients. As expected, both control variables RATING and LnASSETS and are 
significantly negatively correlated with LnINTEREST and SECDEBT. Also the positive 
correlation between Adj%LEVERAGE and LnINTEREST, negative correlation between 
Adj%LIQUIDITY and LnINTEREST, and positive correlation between BSBLOAT and 
SECDEBT follow the expectations. Surprisingly, however, both ACCRUALS and BSBLOAT 
are negatively correlated with LnINTEREST, and Adj%LEVERAGE negatively correlated 
with SECDEBT. 
MATURITY is not strongly correlated with any of the explanatory variables. The 
relatively small but statistically significant correlation between ACCRUALS and 
MATURITY is negative as expected. The only other variable that is significantly 
correlated with MATURITY is Adj%LIQUIDITY which, contrary to expectations, has a 
negative correlation coefficient. Of the four adjustment variables, Adj%LEVERAGE 
seems to be most strongly associated with terms of debt. There is also evidence on the 
association between Adj%LIQUIDITY and terms of debt. Adj%PROFITABILITY and 
Adj%FCF, on the other hand, are not statistically significantly correlated with any of the 
dependent variables. 
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TABLE 8: CORRELATIONS 
 
Ln 
INTEREST SECDEBT 
Ln 
MATURITY RATING LnASSETS ACCRUALS BSBLOAT 
Adj% 
LEVERAGE 
Adj% 
PROFITAB. 
Adj% 
LIQUIDITY Adj% FCF 
LnINTEREST 
 
0,075 -0,094 -0,286 -0,166 -0,170 -0,313 0,266 -0,063 -0,103 0,003 
SECDEBT -0,008 
 
-0,053 -0,329 -0,254 0,067 0,229 -0,143 -0,006 -0,018 -0,038 
LnMATURITY -0,049 -0,023   0,026 -0,003 -0,070 -0,054 -0,020 -0,049 -0,133 -0,031 
RATING -0,202 -0,357 0,029 
 
0,575 0,036 -0,077 0,080 -0,024 0,082 0,042 
LnASSETS -0,107 -0,267 -0,033 0,599 
 
0,033 -0,141 0,198 -0,092 0,054 0,030 
ACCRUALS -0,243 0,057 -0,122 0,023 -0,009 
 
0,108 -0,023 -0,154 0,071 -0,062 
BSBLOAT -0,256 0,207 -0,036 -0,123 -0,134 0,147 
 
-0,568 0,106 0,099 -0,048 
Adj% LEVERAGE 0,321 -0,114 -0,038 0,120 0,112 -0,055 -0,349 
 
-0,155 -0,155 0,065 
Adj% PROFITABILITY -0,036 -0,014 -0,050 0,049 0,016 -0,044 -0,056 0,140 
 
0,119 0,003 
Adj% LIQUIDITY -0,033 -0,062 -0,045 0,146 0,075 0,005 -0,070 0,193 0,207 
 
0,003 
Adj% FCF -0,044 -0,058 -0,015 0,034 0,016 -0,020 0,012 -0,047 -0,016 0,025   
 
The table presents Pearson (lower left) and Spearman rank (upper right) correlation coefficients. Bold font indicates that the correlation is statistically significant 
at the 5% level. Correlation coefficients are highlighted based on their values: the bigger the correlation, the darker the background. The sample consists of 842 
firm-year observations. All variables are defined in Table 3. 
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6.3 Regression results 
In the previous section, the relationship between variables was examined with 
correlation analysis. In this section, a more comprehensive analysis is conducted with 
ordinary least squares multiple regression analysis. Unlike correlation analysis, multiple 
regression analysis can simultaneously take into account a number of explanatory 
variables. The three regression models presented in section 5.3.2 are next run 
separately for each dependent variable. 
6.3.1 LnINTEREST as dependent variable 
TABLE 9: REGRESSION RESULTS – LNINTEREST AS DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
  
Pred. 
sign   Model 0   Model 1   Model 2   
(Constant) 
  
-1.810 *** -1.731 *** -1.755 *** 
   
[-11.80]  [-11.27]  [-12.13]  
RATING - 
 
-0.012 
 
-0.018 * -0.025 *** 
   
[-1.51]  [-2.28]  [-3.34]  
LnASSETS - 
 
-0.057 ** -0.044 * -0.040 * 
  
 
  [-3.24]   [-2.53]   [-2.43]   
ACCRUALS + 
   
-0.059 
 
-0.066 
      
[-0.24]  [-0.29] 
 
BSBLOAT + 
   
-0.261 *** -0.138 ** 
  
 
      [-5.15]   [-2.82]   
Adj% PROFITABILITY - 
     
-0.059 * 
       
[-2.58]  
Adj% LEVERAGE + 
     
0.201 *** 
       
[10.25] 
 
Adj% LIQUIDITY - 
     
-0.128 * 
       
[-2.19] 
 
Adj% FCF - 
     
-0.004 
    
          [-0.40]   
Year, industry and country 
dummies 
  
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Adj. R2 
  
38.9 % 
 
40.9 % 
 
48.4 % 
 Model F-value 
  
5.875 
 
6.204 
 
7.802 
 Significance of F-value 
  
0.000 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
 
 Models control for year, industry and country fixed effects. T-statistics are reported in parentheses 
below the coefficient estimates. ***. **. *, ⁺ denote significance at the 0.1%, 1%, 5% and 10% level, 
respectively. The sample consists of 842 firm-year observations. All variables are defined in Table 3. 
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As seen in Table 9, Model 0 has an R2 of 38.9%. That is, the control variables account for 
38.9% of the variance in LnINTEREST. When accounting quality variables are added to 
the model, its explanatory power increases: Model 1 has an R2 of 40.9% and Model 2 an 
R2 of 48.4%. All three models are statistically significant (significance of F-value < 
0.001). 
As expected, control variables RATING and LnASSETS are negatively associated with 
LnINTEREST: the bigger the firm and the higher its rating, the lower its interest cost. 
Interestingly, the significance of RATING increases and the significance of LnASSETS 
decreases when accounting quality variables are added to the model. ACCRUALS has 
very low t-values in both models 1 and 2, and is thus not even close of being statistically 
significant. The other accruals measure, BSBLOAT, is statistically significant. Contrary to 
expectations, however, it has a positive sign. 
Of the four adjustment variables used in Model 2, three are statistically significant. 
These three variables also have the expected signs: when PROFITABILITY and 
LIQUIDITY are adjusted downward, and LEVERAGE upward, interest rate increases 
(and vice versa). That is, when financial statements are adjusted so that firms appear 
more risky, they have to pay higher interest rates. The t-value of Adj%FCF is very low, 
indicating that adjustment made on free cash flow do not affect debt pricing. 
6.3.2 SECDEBT as dependent variable 
As seen in Table 10, Model 0 has an R2 of 40.7%. That is, the control variables account 
for 40.7% of the variance in SECDEBT. Adding accounting quality variables to the model 
has very little effect on its explanatory power: Model 1 has an R2 of 40.6% and Model 2 
an R2 of 40.9%. All three models are statistically significant (significance of F-value < 
0.001). 
As expected, both RATING and LnASSETS are negatively associated with SECDEBT. That 
is, bigger firms with higher ratings have less secured debt than smaller firms with lower 
ratings. RATING seems to be especially important in determining the amount of 
SECDEBT (p < 0.001). 
The accounting quality variables ACCRUALS and BSBLOAT are not statistically 
significantly associated with SECDEBT. Due to their low t-values (|t| < 1), the R2 actually 
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drops slightly when these variables are added to the model. Also the impact of the 
financial statement adjustments on the amount of SECDEBT is relatively small. Of the 
four adjustment variables added to the Model 2, two are statistically significant at the 
10% level. Adjustments made to the FCF have the expected sign: the more free cash flow 
is adjusted upwards, the less the firms have SECDEBT. Contrary to the expectations, 
however, the coefficient of Adj%LIQUIDITY is positive, indicating that firms whose 
liquidity is adjusted upward have more SECDEBT that those whose liquidity is adjusted 
downward. 
TABLE 10: REGRESSION RESULTS – SECDEBT AS DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
  
Pred. 
sign   Model 0   Model 1   Model 2 
  
(Constant) 
  
0.503 *** 0.487 *** 0.472 *** 
 
[6.60] 
 
[6.28] 
 
[6.04] 
 
RATING - 
 
-0.019 *** -0.019 *** -0.019 *** 
  
[-4.92] 
 
[-4.82] 
 
[-4.79] 
 
LnASSETS - 
 
-0.016 ⁺ -0.016 ⁺ -0.015 ⁺ 
  
 
  [-1.85]   [-1.78] 
 
[-1.64] 
 
ACCRUALS + 
   
-0.116 
 
-0.132 
   
[-0.95] [-1.07] 
BSBLOAT + 
   
0.016 
 
0.008 
    
      [0.63]   [0.30] 
Adj% PROFITABILITY - 
     
0.003 
   
[0.21] 
Adj% LEVERAGE + 
     
-0.016 
   
[-1.49] 
Adj% LIQUIDITY - 
     
0.052 ⁺ 
  
[1.66] 
 
Adj% FCF - 
     
-0.008 ⁺ 
       
[-1.71] 
 
Year, industry and 
country dummies 
  
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 Adj. R
2 
  
40.7 % 
 
40.6 % 
 
40.9 % 
 Model F-value 
  
6.248 
 
6.141 
 
6.011 
 Significance of F-value 
  
0.000 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
 
 Models control for year, industry and country fixed effects. T-statistics are reported in parentheses 
below the coefficient estimates. ***. **. *, ⁺ denote significance at the 0.1%, 1%, 5% and 10% level, 
respectively. The sample consists of 842 firm-year observations. All variables are defined in Table 3. 
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6.3.3 LnMATURITY as dependent variable 
As seen in Table 11, Model 0 has an R2 of 18.8%, Model 1 an R2 of 19.7% and Model 2 an 
R2 of 21.4%. That is, adding the accounting quality variables to the model slightly 
increases its explanatory power. All three models are statistically significant (F < 0.001). 
RATING has a low t-value (|t| < 1) in all three models, indicating that credit rating is not 
associated with loan maturity. The apparent lack of association between rating and 
maturity may, however, arise from the model specification that assumes linear 
relationship between these variables. Diamond’s (1991) liquidity risk theory suggests 
that there is a non-linear relationship between rating and maturity. He argues that firms 
with highest ratings prefer short-term debt, while those with intermediate ratings 
prefer long-term debt to avoid the liquidity risk10. Firms with the poorest ratings, on the 
other hand, use short-term debt because they are unable to get long-term financing.  
LnASSETS is statistically significant at the 5% level, but its coefficient is, contrary to the 
expectations, negative. This implies that bigger firms have shorter loan maturities than 
smaller firms. One possible explanation is that bigger firms tend to have better credit 
ratings (e.g. Kraft, 2011; Tanthanongsakkun & Treepongkaruna, 2008) and therefore 
lower liquidity risk (Diamond, 1991), which makes short-term borrowing beneficial to 
them. Moreover, Barclay and Smith (Barclay & Smith, 1995) found that debt maturity 
increases with firm size for firms smaller than $1 billion of market value, and that after 
that point there is a negative relation. Majority of my sample firms have relatively high 
ratings and market value much bigger than $1 billion11, which may explain the negative 
coefficient. ACCRUALS variable is statistically significant at the 1% level in both Model 1 
and Model 2, and has the expected negative sign. That is, firms with high accruals (i.e. 
low cash flows relative to their reported earnings) are likely to obtain shorter loan 
maturities than firms with low accruals. The other accruals measure, BSBLOAT, is not 
statistically significant. 
Of the four adjustment variables in Model 2, only Adj%LEVERAGE is statistically 
significant. It has the expected negative coefficient, indicating that when LEVERAGE is 
                                                        
10 Liquidity risk is the risk that a solvent but illiquid firm is unable to obtain refinancing (Diamond, 1991). 
11 There is market value data available for 618 firm-year observations (73% of the total sample of 842 
firm-year observations). Nearly 90% of these observations have a market value bigger than $1 billion, 
and over 80% market value bigger than $2 billion. The median market value is $8.23 billion. 
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adjusted upward (which makes a firm appear more risky), loan maturities become 
shorter. Adjustments made to PROFITABILITY, LIQUIDITY or FCF seem to have no effect 
on loan maturity. 
TABLE 11: REGRESSION RESULTS – LNMATURITY AS DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
  
Pred. 
sign   Model 0   Model 1   Model 2   
(Constant) 
  
3.005 *** 2.691 *** 2.762 *** 
 
[5.58] 
 
[4.94] 
 
[5.08] 
 
RATING + 
 
0.008 
 
0.009 
 
0.026 
   
[0.28] [0.31] [0.93] 
LnASSETS + 
 
-0.141 * -0.130 * -0.144 * 
  
 
  [-2.28]   [-2.09]   [-2.32]   
ACCRUALS - 
   
-2.454 ** -2.472 ** 
  
[-2.85] 
 
[-2.90] 
 
BSBLOAT - 
   
0.265 
 
0.076 
    
      [1.48]   [0.42]   
Adj% PROFITABILITY + 
     
-0.032 
   
[-0.38] 
Adj% LEVERAGE - 
     
-0.278 *** 
  
[-3.77] 
 
Adj% LIQUIDITY + 
     
-0.299 
   
[-1.37] 
Adj% FCF + 
     
-0.008 
 
       
[-0.22] 
 
Year, industry and 
country dummies 
  
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 Adj. R
2 
  
18.8 % 
 
19.7 % 
 
21.4 % 
 Model F-value 
  
2.775 
 
2.844 
 
2.974 
 Significance of F-value 
  
0.000 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
 
         Models control for year, industry and country fixed effects. T-statistics are reported in parentheses 
below the coefficient estimates. ***. **. *, ⁺ denote significance at the 0.1%, 1%, 5% and 10% level, 
respectively. The sample consists of 842 firm-year observations. All variables are defined in Table 3. 
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6.4 Supplementary analysis 
Supplementary analysis is performed in order to provide additional insight into the 
association between accounting quality and terms of debt. 
6.4.1 Difference between investment grade and speculative grade firms 
Model 2 (i.e. the model with all accounting quality variables) is run separately for 
investment grade and speculative grade firms in order to examine whether the impact 
of accounting quality differs between these two categories. The results are reported in 
Table 12. 
The difference is prominent especially in the case of LnINTEREST. The interest rate paid 
by investment grade firms is influenced by RATING, BSBLOAT and adjustments made to 
PROFITABILITY, LEVERAGE and LIQUIDITY. The interest charged from speculative 
grade firms, on the other hand, is only affected by adjustments made to LEVERAGE and 
marginally by firm size. Results suggest that when lending to firms with lower credit 
quality, lenders are mainly concerned about the amount of existing debt. When the 
credit quality of the borrower is higher, lenders consider a wider variety of factors. 
Also the amount of SECDEBT is more affected by accounting quality variables in the 
investment grade sample than in the speculative grade sample. In the investment grade 
sample, the amount of SECDEBT is influenced by ACCRUALS and adjustments made to 
LEVERAGE and LIQUIDITY. The adjustment variables, however, have unexpected signs: 
the results suggest that investment grade firms whose leverage is adjusted downward 
and liquidity upward have more secured debt than others.  In the speculative grade 
sample, the amount of SECDEBT is influenced only by RATING and marginally by 
ACCRUALS. 
LnMATURITY seems to be determined by factors other than accounting quality in both 
samples. Also Adj%LEVERAGE – a variable that was statistically very significant 
(p<0.001) in the main analysis – becomes insignificant when investment grade and 
speculative grade firms are examined separately. RATING, on the other hand, becomes 
statistically significant in both subsamples. 
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TABLE 12: DIFFERENCE BETWEEN INVESTMENT GRADE AND SPECULATIVE GRADE FIRMS 
 
LnINTEREST 
 
SECDEBT 
 
LnMATURITY 
 
Pred. 
sign 
Inv. 
grade 
 
Spec. 
Grade 
  
Pred. 
sign 
Inv. 
grade 
 
Spec. 
Grade 
  
Pred. 
sign 
Inv. 
grade 
 
Spec. 
Grade 
 (Constant) 
 
-2.183 *** -1.699 *** 
  
0.300 ** 0.218 
   
124.182 + 55.352 
 
  
[-9.07] 
 
[-5.82] 
   
[3.09] 
 
[0.94] 
   
[1.66] 
 
[0.74] 
 RATING - -0.031 ** -0.013 
  
- -0.001 
 
-0.034 * 
 
+ 10.160 ** 11.632 * 
  
[-2.72] 
 
[-0.62] 
   
[-0.28] 
 
[-2.06] 
   
[2.85] 
 
[2.19] 
 LnASSETS - 0.021 
 
-0.064 + 
 
- -0.023 ** 0.037 
  
+ -25.425 *** -15.909 + 
    [0.99]  [-1.78]      [-2.68]   [1.30]     [-3.79]   [-1.72]   
ACCRUALS + -0.217 
 
0.013 
  
+ 0.245 * -0.514 + 
 
- -71.664 
 
-117.000 
 
  
[-0.74] 
 
[0.04] 
   
[2.06] 
 
[-1.84] 
   
[-0.78] 
 
[-1.29] 
 BSBLOAT + -0.237 *** 0.001 
  
+ -0.031 
 
0.036 
  
- 21.712 
 
-3.671 
     [-3.69]   [0.02]     [-1.20]  [0.58]     [1.09]  [-0.18]  
Adj% PROFITABILITY - -0.117 *** 0.022 
  
- 0.004 
 
-0.022 
  
+ -0.255 
 
-1.842 
 
  
[-4.17] 
 
[0.58] 
   
[0.40] 
 
[-0.73] 
   
[-0.03] 
 
[-0.19] 
 Adj% LEVERAGE + 0.201 *** 0.218 *** 
 
+ -0.021 ** -0.050 
  
- -5.918 
 
0.103 
 
  
[8.91] 
 
[5.18] 
   
[-2.26] 
 
[-1.49] 
   
[-0.84] 
 
[0.01] 
 Adj% LIQUIDITY - -0.153 * -0.155 
  
- 0.054 ** -0.005 
  
+ -27.378 
 
-29.898 
 
  
[-2.31] 
 
[-0.68] 
   
[2.02] 
 
[-0.03] 
   
[-1.33] 
 
[-0.51] 
 Adj% FCF - -0.002 
 
-0.007 
  
- -0.002 
 
-0.017 
  
+ 1.797 
 
0.003 
 
  
[-0.16]  [-0.45]     [-0.37]  [-1.29]     [0.56]  [0.00] 
 Year, industry and country dummies Yes 
 
Yes 
   
Yes 
 
Yes 
   
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
                  Adj. R square 
 
50.3 % 
 
60.2 % 
   
45.5 % 
 
33.4 % 
   
24.2 % 
 
52.6 % 
 Model F-value 
 
6.852 
 
5.933 
   
5.823 
 
2.637 
   
2.376 
 
2.925 
 Significance of F-value 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
   
0.000 
 
0.000 
   
0.000 
 
0.000 
 N 
 
567 
 
275 
   
567 
 
275 
   
567 
 
275 
 
                  Models control for year, industry and country fixed effects. T-statistics are reported in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. ***. **. *, ⁺ denote significance 
at the 0.1%, 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. All variables are defined in Table 3. 
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6.4.2 Logistic regression on secured debt 
Majority (nearly 65%) of sample firms in this thesis do not have any secured debt. 
Consequently, OLS regression may not be ideal tool for the analysis. The association 
between accounting quality and secured debt is therefore examined also using logistic 
regression model. In logistic regression, the dependent variable is binary, that is, it takes 
value 0 or 1. The dependent variable SECDEBT_DUMMY is therefore coded so that it 
takes value 1 if the firm has secured debt and 0 otherwise. 
The results of the logistic regression model are reported in Table 13. They are broadly 
consistent with the results of the main analysis (see Table 10): RATING seems to be the 
most important factor in determining the amount of secured debt. Of the six accounting 
quality variables analyzed, only Adj%LIQUIDITY is statistically significant, and 
BSBLOAT nearly significant. Both, however, have unexpected signs. The results suggest 
that the more the balance sheet is bloated, and the more liquidity is adjusted downward, 
the less the firm has secured debt. 
 TABLE 13: LOGISTIC REGRESSION ON SECURED DEBT 
 
Predicted sign 
 
Coefficient Wald χ2 p 
CONSTANT 
  
-0.693 
 
0.369 0,544 
RATING - 
 
-0.369 *** 26.370 0,000 
LnASSETS_USDMILLION - 
 
0.352 * 5.957 0,015 
ACCRUALS + 
 
-2.505 
 
1.663 0,197 
BSBLOAT + 
 
-0.796 + 3.751 0,053 
Adj% PROFITABILITY - 
 
0.048 
 
0.055 0,814 
Adj% LEVERAGE + 
 
-0.132 
 
0.786 0,375 
Adj% LIQUIDITY - 
 
1.620 ** 6.726 0,010 
Adj% FCF - 
 
-0.048 
 
0.418 0,518 
Year, industry and country 
dummies 
 
  
Yes 
      
Nagelkerke R2 0.668 
     Likehood ratio χ2 560.253 (p < 0.001) 
   
      Model controls for year, industry and country fixed effects. ***. **. *, ⁺ denote significance at the 0.1%, 
1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. The sample consists of 842 firm-year observations. The dependent 
variable SECDEBT_DUMMY takes value 1 if the firm has secured debt and 0 otherwise. All other variables 
are defined in Table 3. 
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6.4.3 The amount of balance sheet bloat (BSBLOAT) 
As discussed in section 5.2, BSBLOAT is a cumulative accruals measure. Since earnings 
performance of firms with high accruals is unlikely to be sustainable, I expected that 
firms with bloated balance sheets would get debt at poorer conditions than those with 
less bloated balance sheets. Yet, the regression results indicate that BSBLOAT is not 
statistically significantly associated with either SECDEBT or MATURITY. The association 
between BSBLOAT and LnINTEREST, on the other hand, appears to be negative: the 
higher the BSBLOAT value, the lower the interest rate. Interestingly, however, when the 
speculative grade firms are examined separately, no connection between BSBLOAT and 
LnINTEREST is found – in fact, the t-value of BSBLOAT becomes very close to zero 
(0.02). These results warrant further investigation. 
In their study, Hirshleifer et al. (2004) rank their sample firms by the amount of balance 
sheet bloat and sort them into ten portfolios. They note that the extreme (both high and 
low) bloat firms have the highest betas and are therefore riskier than other firms. In 
order to examine whether different levels of balance sheet bloat have a different effect 
on the interest rate, I sort my sample firms in ten groups based on their BSBLOAT 
values and then test 3 alternative specifications of Model 2. 
In model 2.1 BSBLOAT is replaced with two new dummy variables: HighBLOAT_dummy 
equals 1 if the value of BSBLOAT belongs to decile 10, and zero otherwise; and 
LowBLOAT_dummy equals 1 if the value of BSBLOAT belongs to decile 1, and zero 
otherwise. In model 2.2 BSBLOAT is accompanied by these two new dummy variables. 
In Model 2.3 BSBLOAT is replaced with three new variables: HighBLOAT_value equals 
BSBLOAT if the value of BSBLOAT belongs to decile 10, and zero otherwise; 
MedBLOAT_value equals BSBLOAT if the value of BSBLOAT belongs to deciles 2 through 
9, and zero otherwise; and LowBLOAT_value equals BSBLOAT if the value of BSBLOAT 
belongs to decile 1, and zero otherwise. 
The results presented in Table 14 are consistent with the main analysis: the higher the 
value of BSBLOAT, the lower the interest rate. Interestingly, firms with low BSBLOAT 
values pay significantly higher interest rates than other firms. Models 2.1 – 2.3 were 
also run separately on investment grade and speculative grade firms, and the results 
(not tabulated) were, again, similar to those in previous analysis: high BSBLOAT values 
54 
 
lower the interest rate in the investment grade sample but not in the speculative grade 
sample. There is, however, weak evidence that low values of BSBLOAT increase the 
interest rate also in the speculative grade sample. 
TABLE 14: ADDITIONAL ANALYSIS ON BSBLOAT 
  
Dependent variable: LnINTEREST 
 Predicted sign Model 2.1   Model 2.2   Model 2.3   
(Constant) 
 
-1,920 *** -1,872 *** -1,779 *** 
  
[-13,31] 
 
[-12,55] 
 
[-12,02] 
 RATING - -0,021 ** -0,022 ** -0,022 ** 
  
[-2,79] 
 
[-2,91] 
 
[-2,92] 
 LnASSETS - -0,042 ** -0,041 * -0,042 ** 
  
[-2,62] 
 
[-2,5] 
 
[-2,58] 
 ACCRUALS + -0,085 
 
-0,076 
 
-0,051 
 
  
[-0,38] 
 
[-0,34] 
 
[-0,23] 
 BSBLOAT + 
  
-0,090 
   
    
[-1,25] 
   HighBLOAT_dummy + -0,039 
 
0,023 
   
  
[-0,78] 
 
[0,32] 
   LowBLOAT_dummy ? 0,259 *** 0,226 *** 
  
  
[4,67] 
 
[3,65] 
   HighBLOAT_value + 
    
-0,118 * 
      
[-2,26] 
 MedBLOAT_value + 
    
-0,231 ** 
      
[-2,69] 
 LowBLOAT_value ? 
    
0,638 * 
      
[2,03] 
 Adj_PROFITABILITY - -0,068 ** -0,068 ** -0,068 ** 
  
[-2,98] 
 
[-2,95] 
 
[-2,98] 
 Adj_LEVERAGE + 0,175 *** 0,172 *** 0,173 *** 
  
[8,52] 
 
[8,32] 
 
[8,54] 
 Adj_LIQUIDITY - -0,131 * -0,128 * -0,111 + 
  
[-2,07] 
 
[-2,01] 
 
[-1,75] 
 Adj_FCF + -0,003 
 
-0,004 
 
-0,004 
     [-0,32]  [-0,40]  [-0,49]  
Adj. R square 
 
49,3 % 
 
49,3 % 
 
49,6 % 
 Model F-value 
 
7,978 
 
7,930 
 
8,025 
 Significance of F-value 
 
0,000 
 
0,000 
 
0,000 
 
Models control for year, industry and country fixed effects. T-statistics are reported in parentheses 
below the coefficient estimates. ***. **. *, ⁺ denote significance at the 0.1%, 1%, 5% and 10% level, 
respectively. The sample consists of 842 firm-year observations. HighBLOAT_dummy equals 1 if the 
value of BSBLOAT belongs to decile 10, and zero otherwise; LowBLOAT_dummy equals 1 if the value of 
BSBLOAT belongs to decile 1, and zero otherwise. HighBLOAT_value equals BSBLOAT if the value of 
BSBLOAT belongs to decile 10, and zero otherwise; MedBLOAT_value equals BSBLOAT if the value of 
BSBLOAT belongs to deciles 2 through 9, and zero otherwise; and LowBLOAT_value equals BSBLOAT if 
the value of BSBLOAT belongs to decile 1, and zero otherwise. All other variables are defined in Table 3. 
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Overall, results suggest that lenders view low BSBLOAT values (but not high BSBLOAT 
values) as a risk factor that increases the interest rate charged from the borrowers. 
Hirshleifer et al. (2004, 305) note that while high BSBLOAT values may indicate 
lingering problems in converting accruals into cash flows, they may also reflect strong 
investment opportunities, growth and cash to come. This may explain why investment 
grade firms with high BSBLOAT values pay lower interest rates: when the credit risk of 
a borrower is low, lenders may see high BSBLOAT value as a sign of good business 
conditions, and therefore charge a lower risk premium. Further analysis on BSBLOAT is 
out of the scope of this thesis. It would be, however, interesting to examine how high 
level of BSBLOAT affects the debt terms in the long run. 
6.5 Summary of the empirical results 
As expected, the control variables RATING and LnASSETS are negatively associated with 
LnINTEREST and SECDEBT: Big firms with high ratings pay lower interest rates and 
have less secured debt than small firms with low ratings. The association between 
RATING, LnASSETS and LnMATURITY is more complex because of possible non-
monotonic relationship between these variables. 
As regards to accruals variables, ACCRUALS is, consistent with expectations, negatively 
associated with MATURITY. In other words, firms that have low cash flows relative to 
their earnings are likely to borrow short-term. This indicates that lenders perceive high 
accruals as a risk factor, and are therefore reluctant to provide long-term financing to 
firms with high accruals. No statistically significant association between ACCRUALS and 
LnINTEREST or SECDEBT is found. 
BSBLOAT is statistically significantly associated with LnINTEREST but not with 
SECDEBT or LnMATURITY. Contrary to the expectations, however, the relation is 
negative: the higher the BSBLOAT, the lower the interest rate. Interestingly, firms with 
the lowest BSBLOAT (that is, those belonging to the lowest decile) pay significantly 
higher interest rates than other firms. 
As regards to adjustment variables, I find that most adjustments lead to an increase in 
LEVERAGE and decrease in PROFITABILITY and LIQUIDITY. That is, the adjusted 
financial statements, in general, make the sample firms look more risky than the 
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reported financial statements. The adjustments have strong impact especially on 
LEVERAGE (18.3% increase for a median firm) and PROFITABILITY (6.2% decrease for 
a median firm). Their impact on LIQUIDITY is smaller (1.0% decrease for a median 
firm). The adjustments made on FCF are relatively large (median absolute magnitude is 
12.7%), but distributed quite evenly between positive (“up”) and negative (“down”) 
adjustments. 
As expected, regression results show that adjustments made to LEVERAGE are 
positively associated with LnINTEREST and negatively associated with LnMATURITY: 
the more leverage is adjusted upward, the higher the interest rate and the shorter the 
maturity. Also consistent with the expectations, results suggest that adjustments made 
to PROFITABILITY and LIQUIDITY are negatively associated with LnINTEREST. That is, 
the more profitability and liquidity are adjusted downward, the higher the interest rate. 
Adj%FCF is not statistically significantly associated with any of the dependent variables, 
although its negative relation with SECDEBT is almost significant (p=0.087). 
Interestingly, the impact of accounting quality on terms of debt is more prominent in 
the investment grade firms than in the speculative grade firms, especially when interest 
rate is considered. Of the four adjustment variables examined, only the adjustments 
made to leverage are statistically significantly associated with interest rate in the 
speculative grade sample. In the investment grade sample, the interest rate is also 
related to the adjustments made to profitability and liquidity. This indicates that when 
lending to firms with lower credit quality, lenders are mainly concerned about their 
level of indebtedness. When the credit quality of a borrower is higher (and thus the 
default risk smaller), lenders consider a wider variety of accounting quality factors. 
Overall, the evidence suggests that lenders take borrowers’ accounting quality into 
account when designing debt contracts. The impact of accounting quality is, however, 
mainly reflected in the interest rate: firms with high accounting quality pay lower 
interest rates than firms with low accounting quality. The evidence on the link between 
accounting quality and secured debt and loan maturity is weaker and somewhat mixed.  
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7 CONCLUSIONS 
Financial reporting can be viewed as a mechanism that enables the monitoring of the 
performance and financial situation of a firm, thereby mitigating the information 
asymmetry problems between firm insiders and outsiders. In debt markets, lenders use 
accounting information to evaluate the creditworthiness of borrowers. When 
borrower’s accounting quality is high, there is less uncertainty regarding its future, and 
it is easier to assess its credit quality. High quality accounting should therefore reduce 
information risks related to borrower. 
In this thesis, I examine the association between accounting quality and terms of debt. 
More specifically, I examine whether firms with high accounting quality are able to 
obtain debt financing at better terms (i.e. with lower interest rates, less securitization 
and longer maturities) than firms with low accounting quality. I use two types of 
variables to measure accounting quality: (1) accruals variables that measure the 
difference between reported earnings and cash flows and (2) adjustment variables that 
measure the difference between original (reported by firms) and adjusted (modified by 
the rating agency) financial statement figures. 
My main findings are as follows. First, I find that the financial statement adjustments 
made by the credit rating agency, in general, make the sample firms appear more risky. 
The adjustments have a strong impact especially on LEVERAGE, which is adjusted 
upward for 93.7% of the sample and experiences a median increase of 18.3%. Second, I 
find evidence supporting the hypothesis that accounting quality is indeed incorporated 
into debt contracts.  The information risk from lower accounting quality is, however, 
mainly reflected in the interest rate: the lower the accounting quality, the higher the 
interest rate. The evidence on the association between accounting quality and 
securitization and maturity is weaker and somewhat mixed. Finally, my results indicate 
that the impact of accounting quality differs between investment grade and speculative 
grade firms. The difference is prominent especially in the case of interest rate. It seems 
that when lending to firms with lower credit quality, lenders are mainly concerned 
about the amount of existing debt. When the credit quality of the borrower is higher, 
lenders consider a wider variety of factors. 
58 
 
When interpreting the results, it is important to note that the sample firms are big 
(median firm has total assets of USD 8.3 billion), have debt ratings and that majority of 
them are public. Prior studies (e.g. Cantillo & Wright, 2000; D. S. Dhaliwal et al., 2011; 
Faulkender & Petersen, 2006) have shown that the correspondence between these 
factors and issuance of public debt is quite high. Bharath et al. (2008) note that there 
are significant institutional differences between the private and public debt markets. 
Private lenders typically have great flexibility in negotiating and resetting the terms of 
debt contract, which allows them to modify both price and non-price terms of debt. 
Public debt, on the other hand, is usually held by dispersed arm’s length investors who 
lack this flexibility. Consequently, in the case of public debt, the price term is the 
primary contractual feature used in response to accounting quality. Given that my 
sample firms are more likely to use public than private debt, it is not surprising that 
accounting quality seemed to have little effect on the loan maturity and securitization. 
This also means that the results may not be generalizable to smaller, unrated firms. 
Another concern is that since there was no detailed information available on the debt 
contracts, the calculation of the dependent variables (“terms of debt”) is based on fairly 
crude estimates, especially in the case of debt maturity. Moreover, the dependent 
variables are all based on reported accounting numbers. That is, the accounting quality 
is likely to affect their reliability. There are also some problems related to using the 
financial statement adjustments as a measure of accounting quality. If the reported 
financial statement is of poor quality, it may not provide enough information for making 
accurate adjustments. Consequently, the financial statements that are adjusted most are 
not necessarily those with the lowest quality. All sample firms, however, report under 
IFRS standards and also face the scrutiny of the rating agency, which means that they 
are subject to quite stringent reporting requirements. I therefore expect that the sample 
does not include firms whose accounting quality is so poor that it would cause any 
major bias to the results. 
To sum up, the key implications arising from this thesis are: (1) lenders consider 
borrowers’ accounting quality when they determine the terms of debt contract and (2) 
the financial statement adjustment made by the rating agency provide information that 
is useful to lenders. A potential avenue for future research would be to examine 
whether the impact of accounting quality on terms of debt differs between firms using 
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different reporting standards (IFRS, US GAAP, Local GAAP). It would also be interesting 
to analyze the interplay between financial statement adjustments and various measures 
of accounting quality. 
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9 APPENDIX: SAMPLE BREAKDOWN BY INDUSTRY AND COUNTRY 
Industry N % 
 
Country N % 
Electric Utilities 97 11,52 % 
 
United Kingdom 169 20,07 % 
Telecommunications 96 11,40 % 
 
Germany 98 11,64 % 
Chemical 45 5,34 % 
 
France 77 9,14 % 
Retail 35 4,16 % 
 
Hong Kong 52 6,18 % 
Building Materials 28 3,33 % 
 
Australia 40 4,75 % 
Homebuilding 22 2,61 % 
 
Netherlands 39 4,63 % 
Auto Supplier 20 2,38 % 
 
Italy 38 4,51 % 
Consumer Packaged Goods 20 2,38 % 
 
Russia 29 3,44 % 
Energy, Oil & Gas - Integrated 19 2,26 % 
 
Sweden 27 3,21 % 
Manufacturing 19 2,26 % 
 
Singapore 23 2,73 % 
Media, Printing, Publishing & Other 18 2,14 % 
 
Finland 22 2,61 % 
Alcoholic Beverage 17 2,02 % 
 
Luxembourg 22 2,61 % 
Steel 17 2,02 % 
 
Norway 17 2,02 % 
Heavy Manufacturing 16 1,90 % 
 
Spain 15 1,78 % 
Pharmaceutical 15 1,78 % 
 
Denmark 14 1,66 % 
Real Estate / REIT 15 1,78 % 
 
Switzerland 14 1,66 % 
Shipping 15 1,78 % 
 
Cayman Islands 13 1,54 % 
Toll Roads 15 1,78 % 
 
South Africa 13 1,54 % 
Media, Broadcast TV & Radio 14 1,66 % 
 
Philippines 12 1,43 % 
Mining 14 1,66 % 
 
Austria 10 1,19 % 
Wholesale Power 14 1,66 % 
 
Poland 9 1,07 % 
Consumer Durables 13 1,54 % 
 
Portugal 9 1,07 % 
Rail Roads 13 1,54 % 
 
Bermuda 7 0,83 % 
Aerospace / Defense 12 1,43 % 
 
Belgium 6 0,71 % 
Business and Consumer Service 12 1,43 % 
 
Ireland 5 0,59 % 
Airports 11 1,31 % 
 
Romania 5 0,59 % 
Packaging 11 1,31 % 
 
Turkey 5 0,59 % 
Paper & Forest Products 11 1,31 % 
 
United Arab Emirates 5 0,59 % 
Construction 10 1,19 % 
 
China 4 0,48 % 
Energy, Gas Distribution - Regulated 10 1,19 % 
 
Greece 4 0,48 % 
Lodging 10 1,19 % 
 
Kazakhstan 4 0,48 % 
Media, Cable Television 10 1,19 % 
 
British Virgin Islands 3 0,36 % 
Protein and Agriculture 9 1,07 % 
 
Chile 3 0,36 % 
Air Freight 8 0,95 % 
 
Croatia 3 0,36 % 
Airlines 8 0,95 % 
 
Estonia 3 0,36 % 
Energy, Oil & Gas - Independent E & P 8 0,95 % 
 
Latvia 3 0,36 % 
Media, Newspapers 8 0,95 % 
 
New Zealand 3 0,36 % 
Telecom Equipment 8 0,95 % 
 
Ukraine 3 0,36 % 
Wholesale Distribution 8 0,95 % 
 
Bulgaria 2 0,24 % 
Energy, Oil Services 7 0,83 % 
 
Czech Republic 2 0,24 % 
Tobacco 7 0,83 % 
 
Hungary 2 0,24 % 
Water Utilities 7 0,83 % 
 
Indonesia 2 0,24 % 
Energy, Natural Gas Pipelines 6 0,71 % 
 
Lithuania 2 0,24 % 
Energy, Oil & Gas - Midstream [MLP] 6 0,71 % 
 
Brazil 1 0,12 % 
Apparel 5 0,59 % 
 
Egypt 1 0,12 % 
Auto Manufacturer 5 0,59 % 
 
Slovenia 1 0,12 % 
Gaming 5 0,59 % 
 
United States 1 0,12 % 
Services - Towers & Satellites 5 0,59 % 
 
Total 842 100,00 % 
Technology Hardware 5 0,59 % 
    Energy, Electricity - Project Finance 4 0,48 % 
    Transportation Equipment Leasing 4 0,48 % 
    Commuter Services 3 0,36 % 
    Energy, Oil & Gas - Refining & Marketing 3 0,36 % 
    Equipment & Auto Rental 3 0,36 % 
    For-Profit Hospital 3 0,36 % 
    Services - Environmental 3 0,36 % 
    Soft Beverage 3 0,36 % 
    Media, Large Diversified 2 0,24 % 
    Medical Products & Devices 2 0,24 % 
    Restaurants 2 0,24 % 
    Leisure & Entertainment 1 0,12 % 
    Total 842 100,00 % 
     
